

The ARYAN PATH

Vol. XXXIV APRIL-MAY Nos. 4-5

ARTICLES INCLUDE

Editorial: Sacrifice. K. Krishnamoorthy & Howard Sergeant: The Nature of Meaning in Poetry. S. Subhash Chandra: The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (II). Olwen Battersby: 'War on Want' and the Bhoodan Movement in India. Margaret Goldsmith: Dr. Mesmer — The Restoration of a Reputation. M. V. Sridatta Sarma: Indian Bird Myths and Legends.

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

The Healing Gods of Ancient Civilizations. Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant and Contemporary Ethical Theories. Edward Conze's Buddhist Thought in India. The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai. Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries. Malory's Le Morte Darthur. The Santals. Traditions of the Indian Army.

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THE ARYAN PATH

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The Editor is glad to be able to place in the readers' hands this combined issue for April and May 1963. This issue comprises seventy-eight pages: somewhat less than the total of two normal monthly issues. Subsequent issues, however, will contain more than the normal forty-eight pages; so that at the end of the year the Volume will contain the usual 576 pages or more.

The next issue will be the normal issue for June 1963 — to appear at the beginning of June.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXXIV APRIL–MAY 1963 NOS. 4–5

SACRIFICE

[WE reprint this editorial from THE ARYAN PATH, June 1931.—ED.]

Prāṇān prāṇeṣu juhvati (Some sacrifice life unto Life)

THE MOST ANCIENT RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHIES teach that the manifested universe is the flower of Sacrifice. The ancient doctrine of Emanations enables us to comprehend the nature and method of this sacrifice, while its modern counterpart of Evolution does *not*. Only in a restricted sense, in connection with the human kingdom, do we ordinarily speak of sacrifice. The Sanskrit term for it, Yagna, conveys much more to the Hindu, for example, than does the word Sacrifice to the Christian, in spite of all that has been said about the Sacrifice of the Christos.

Ordinarily sacrifice, as a principle of morality and ethics, is considered to be very fine and is much more talked about than observed, for the reason that it is little understood. The entire gamut of human evolution is traceable in the expression of Sacrifice. This was explained in a recent lecture in India on the subject of the mystic and Theosophic meaning of Easter — the Universal Festival of Sacrifice. Below we print a full extract which completes the subject under consideration:

The whole universe is an embodiment of sacrifice. Each kingdom sacrifices for every other kingdom. When we obtain the knowledge hidden in Nature, we are not depressed at her ruthlessness; for she is not ruthless, not remorseless. She is Compassion Incarnate. See the laws of Dharma and Yagna as they work in Nature. Nature is dutiful and her whole movement is one Grand Sacrifice. If we apply her ways to ourselves we will learn to sacrifice the senses so that the mind may be born in us; to sacrifice the mind, so that the heart may be born in us; to sacrifice the heart so that the soul may be born in us; to sacrifice the soul so that the spirit may be born in us; to sacrifice the spirit so that the Universal

Spirit, Paramatma, may be born in us.

Sacrifice begets sacrifice — this is the ancient law.

There is the sacrifice of enjoyment and personal pleasure, and it is with this that man begins. To start with, people sacrifice for those they love — to feel the power of their love through that sacrifice. There is no question of motive of duty, but there *is* the giving up of some personal attachment — Raga, in Sanskrit — for a greater and a deeper love. At this stage we sacrifice not because it is right or a duty to sacrifice but because it brings us a deeper joy, a deeper inner satisfaction. On the plane of emotions and feelings this sacrifice manifests itself.

Next, the sense of Duty comes to birth — Dharma. With it is felt some appreciation of Causality and Destiny — Karma — and so to Raga-Attachment, the other member of the pair is added, Dvesha-Dislike. People begin to sacrifice not only for loved ones, but also for persons, objects, aims, which they may not, often do not love, but which they feel are good and should be sacrificed for out of a sense of Duty. It is at this stage that mortification is practised. We feel we must sacrifice although we do not like to do it. Note here that the objects for which sacrifice is made, have increased in number. While in the first type, we perform sacrifice out of selfish attachment or affection for our own circumscribed personal self; in the second a sense of duty, by which that personal self is mortified, shows itself. In the first, to take but one example, sacrifice is confined to friends and kin; in the second its scope increases; a less personal position is taken, but still sacrifice moves in a restricted circle, and looks forward to receiving its due fruits. Communal charity, national benefactions which bring fame and popularity, are in this second class of yagna or sacrifice.

This leads to the third kind. When the expected results of sacrifice do not come forth, much confusion and some enquiry ensue. When a man has given a lakh or two of rupees and still his name does not appear in the list of K.C.S.I.'s, he wonders — of course within his own heart — what is the matter? The same phenomenon takes place in other spheres; for example, a social servant sacrifices in the hope of achieving a good result, and when it is not forthcoming, he asks — why did this happen? It is at this stage that man finds out that sacrifice without knowledge is not real sacrifice. Numerous are the steps and stages in this third compartment. Man learns slowly, his ignorance dies very hard! He learns that it is better to feed the mind than to feed the body; better to sacrifice for the nation than for the community, which is part of

that nation; better to clothe the soul than to clothe the mind; better to help man build his own bodily temple and become his own priest than to build temples and mosques and churches and synagogues. Just as mortification guides the second kind of sacrifice, so knowledge energizes this third type of yagna.

This search through knowledge brings man to real or spiritual sacrifice. He sees that sacrifice is not only doing something to some one with what we possess, it is not only giving of wealth or even of knowledge that we possess, but it is an act of life. All acts should be sacrifices, teaches the *Gita*. This means that whatever we do must be done with a Life-Ideation, with a Heart-Energy. To throw a coin to a beggar is outer sacrifice — the motive, the thought, the energy behind the act makes it real or unreal, complete or not complete. Sacrifice life with Life. The great Life sacrifices for the little life; the Great Masters for the little world. To practise that high kind of true sacrifice, all duties and deeds of life must be used. Here, giving and receiving becomes one, the sinner and the saint commingle, the sacrificer has become sacrifice itself. It is somewhat difficult to understand, but in this is the true meaning of the Sacrifice of the Christos, the Universal Self, of Vishvakarma, the Divine Carpenter, the Yazeshnae which Ahura Mazda performed, the Yagna of Maheshwara.

How shall we learn to perform this kind of sacrifice? By learning the art of seeing the divine aspect of all that we do, of all that we contact. Learn to discern the Spirit working in all you do. You are eating? Thus are you nourishing the Gods who nourish you. You are bathing? Thus are you cleansing earth of its sins — the task of the Gods. You are reading? Thus are you enlightening the darkness of ignorance as the Masters do. You are giving help? Such is the gift that Nature and the Lords of Nature bestow, like rain and sunshine and sweet breezes — feel grateful for the opportunity that is yours. You are receiving help? Be like flowers, happy to receive warmth and light; be contented and busy as the bee, receiving sweetness from the buds and blossoms; be like the sacred cow, receiving fodder and then transmuting it into milk for the nourishment of man. If the recipient of charity transforms not what he gets to help others he receives in vain. So — live in sacrifice, thinking of the Great Sacrifice, Adhi-Yagna, the Soul of the soul, He who incarnates that thousands may learn, He who dies so that thousands may know how to die, in order that they may live.

THE NATURE OF MEANING IN POETRY

[We are glad to bring together these substantial studies of an important subject.

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, M.A., B.T., Ph.D., Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Karnatak University, is well known to our readers for his exact and appreciative essays on various aspects of Sanskrit literature.

Mr. Howard Sergeant, whose study of James Joyce we printed in September 1959, is editor of *Outposts*, has edited several anthologies of poetry, and is a critic and a poet in his own right. He has published two collections of poetry. He is able, therefore, to see the modern poet's special difficulty from both the poet's own and the critic's point of view.—Ed.]

I: AN INDIAN APPROACH

While semantics is a science of recent origin in the West, we find in early Indian thought more than one sustained attempt to solve the mystery of meaning in language. Of these, the realistic conclusions of the time-honoured Mīmāṁsakas and the idealist trend in the linguistic thought of the Grammarians (Vaiyākaraṇas) headed by Bhartṛhari may be regarded as typical. The first writers on the art of poetry contented themselves with analysing the structure of poetic language and laying down formal canons of beauty under various heads. They generally defined poetry as a unity (*sāhitya*) of *śabda* (expression) and *artha* (significance) without discussing the nature of these. Writers on drama developed the theory of *rasa* (aesthetic emotion) in great detail without raising the fundamental question of the aesthetic function of language. It was only when these two currents of poetic theory, viz., *alaṁkāra* (beauty) and *rasa*, converged in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* (*c.* A.D. 850) that the problem of meaning in poetry for the first time received a systematic consideration. It was only then that Poetics in India came to be raised to the rank of Aesthetics. An attempt is made here to present the groundwork of semantics on which Ānandavardhana rears his aesthetic theory of *dhvani* or suggestion in poetry.

The concept of *sāhitya* in Indian poetics is something akin to the modern idea of "significant form," and early writers like Bhāmaha proceeded to the task of analysing that essentially indivisible whole into *śabda* (form) and *artha* (content) in formulating their aesthetic canons.

They assumed that both these elements partook of beauty (*alaṁkāra*) only under the conditions of absence of flaws (*doṣas*) and presence of excellences (*guṇas*), conditions which were imposed by logical, grammatical, and aesthetic considerations. Their mistake was that they merely listed them together without trying to differentiate the aesthetic from the logical and the grammatical. Why cacophony should jar on the ear and why "sweetness" (*mādhurya*) is an excellence in poetry as much as "lucidity" (*prasāda*) and "brilliance" (*ojas*) are questions they do not pause to answer. Though they were dimly aware that different compositions have different affective effects on the reader, they tried to explain these more in terms of stylistic structure (*saṁghaṭanā* or *rīti*), which in their analysis was the secret of "significant form" and which varied from poet to poet according to his insight (*pratibhā*), than in terms of the texture of meaning. The theorist thought that since the individual variations of poets were infinite, he could only distinguish between two or three broad types of style, viz., the Sweet (*Vaidarbhī*), the Florid (*Gauḍī*), and the Mixed (*Pāñcālī*). Against this analytical background, they undertook to explain some clear-cut principles of beauty (*alaṁkāra*) relating to form or content. They brought graces of rhyme and alliteration which contribute to rhythm under "form," and graces of metaphor, irony, allusion, fancy, contrast, etc., under "content." Yet nowhere do they state that these graces are just ornaments which may be added or discarded at will by the poet. On the other hand, they are convinced that there would be no beauty in poetry without some *alaṁkāra* or the other, since, in their view, *alaṁkāras* are integral elements of poetic beauty and form the very differentia of poetry. The ornamental use of figures of speech is a much later idea and the early theorists like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin were not aware of it, though many a modern scholar has misjudged them in this respect.

A correct appreciation of the position of early theorists in regard to *alaṁkāra* is necessary to understand their idea of *śabda* and *artha*, which forms the starting point for all semantic investigation. Their outspoken emphasis on *vakrokti*, or departure from the everyday use of language, as the underlying principle of all *alaṁkāras* points to their realization of the fact that poetic language is fundamentally distinct from everyday speech (*vārtā*) on the one hand and the language of science (*śāstra*) on the other; and they happened to give this distinct feature the name of *alaṁkāra*, whose field was theoretically so wide as

to embrace all shades of felt beauty in poetry. Naturally, all the possible meanings in daily discourse and scientific writing, viz., the informative or literal, the secondary or metaphorical, and the affective or emotive, were not only included, but imaginatively coloured so as to become aesthetic, in their illustrations of *arthālaṁkāras.* In their scheme, *svabhāvokti* or sensitive description of nature as it is can be termed *alaṁkāra* only by way of exception; and emotional states (*cittavṛttis*) become *alaṁkāra* only when they are *rasa,* i.e., when they have undergone imaginative transfiguration.

The treatment of *alaṁkāra* by the early theorists is thus practically useful and theoretically sound in its own way; but it is deficient in philosophical investigation into the nature of poetic meaning as such. On this question it takes for granted the conclusions of Mīmāṁsā philosophers on the one hand and thinkers on dramaturgy on the other; and it accommodates them both in the broad category of *alaṁkāra,* laying, all the while, pointed emphasis on beauty, which is the index of the poet's creative activity. None the less, it is clear that by *artha* (content) they never meant the dictionary meaning of words as is often misunderstood or the objects logically denoted by words. The rhetoricians understood by *artha* the meaning-complex intended by the poet or, in other words, his theme.

Now we may turn to the Mīmāṁsā school of philosophy, which provided the basic semantic material for the researches of literary theorists. A serious consideration of the problem of meaning was forced upon this school as it was concerned with vindicating the significance of assertions in the Veda, which was, apparently, a confused mass of fact, myth, and ritual. They laid down not only the conditions of context, etc., which were necessary to understand the meaning of sentences in the scriptures, but also the theory that the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha*) is its whole purport (*tātparya*). They were the first in India to hold that "potency" (*śakti*) should be regarded as a distinct category in ontology; and according to them every sentence has a potency for purport which may admit of error in the case of human speakers, but which is infallible in the case of scriptural statements, as they are not of human origin (*apauruṣeya*).

As components of a sentence, they recognized that words too have a potency to enter into relation with other words and a potency to express their conventional meaning (as defined in the dictionary) or

their secondary meaning as indicated by the context. The potency of words to signify the conventional meaning is given the name *abhidhā* (primary power) and the potency to signify secondary meaning is given the name *lakṣaṇā* (indicatory power). In the sentence "He is an ass," the dictionary meaning of the word "ass" is due to *abhidhā*; the figurative meaning "fool" is due to *lakṣaṇā*. The second is as much sanctioned by usage as the first; but individual speakers may use words in their own private way also to suit their meaning, as in the language of lovers. Emotion does indeed play a part in the metaphorical usage of words in life. But it is raw emotion, and is not the same as aesthetic emotion in poetry. Of the two schools of Mīmāṁsā, one (Prābhākara) holds that the sentence as a whole expresses an undivided meaning (*anvitābhidhāna*), while the other (Bhāṭṭa) believes that word-meanings get related before the sentence-meaning is conveyed (*abhihitānvaya*).

The school of Grammarians (Vaiyākaraṇas) developed a theory of meaning which is more idealistic than that of the Mīmāṁsakas. Their best exponent was Bhartṛhari, who propounded the theory of *sphoṭa* (lit., "burst"), a concept which is primarily semantic. According to this theory, meaning is revealed in a flash by the whole and indivisible aspect of speech, an aspect which underlies all distinctions of syllables or sounds. When we say "cow," the three letters are uttered in sequence, howsoever imperceptible; but the total meaning, "a kind of animal," which we grasp is not the result of any summation of the part-meaning of the three letters. The words analysable into letters in varying shades of tone and pitch must have, according to this school, an abiding whole aspect which alone can reveal a whole meaning; and this aspect is termed *sphoṭa*. Since words can have meaning only in the context of a sentence, the *sphoṭa* of the sentence as a whole should be regarded as the revealer of meaning. This involves recognition of the "revealing power" in the whole *sphoṭa*-aspect of words and sentences. The sentence reveals the *sphoṭa*, which in its turn reveals the meaning in one unitary flash. The revealer of meaning is thus the semantic aspect of *śabda* and the revealer of this in turn is its own linguistic aspect. The other schools of Indian philosophy generally regard the *sphoṭavāda* as a spurious hypothesis.

Bharata, the authority on dramaturgy, approached the problem of

aesthetic experience from a purely psychological standpoint. Recognizing *rasa* as the goal of all art, he said that the major function of the different art-forms was only to evoke *rasa* in the percipient. Dance gestures, musical notes, and poetic language all shared this function in common. He did not undertake to define this function scientifically, but used descriptive terms like *niṣpatti* (causation), *bhāvanā* (stimulation), and *abhivyakti* (manifestation). His chief concern was in contrasting raw emotional states in life (*cittavṛttis*) with the *rasas* in art. In life, emotional moods are momentary and fleeting; they change as situations change; and man has no control over situations. Even dominant emotions like love and hatred obey no artistic unity and are often subordinated or accommodated to the urgent claims of economic and social living. Also, in life we are involved in the emotions, and have no time to contemplate them disinterestedly. But in art man flings off the thraldom of circumstances and turns to contemplate the emotions; and this gives him aesthetic joy. Even a passing mood may be given an artistic permanence as in lyric poetry; and the dominant emotions, with a complexity unknown to everyday life, might make the theme of a whole epic. The emotional unity in the situation, plot, and characters is absent in life and present only in the best literature. Therefore, the sympathetic heart of the reader delights in *rasa* only through literature. The rules of Bharata are mainly devoted to laying down the conditions of plot, character, and style that contribute towards *rasas* in all their variety. Even the tragic emotion becomes singularly pleasurable in poetry because it is aesthetically contemplated and not personally suffered. And even fiction comes to be termed as artistically true for the same reason.

It required a master-mind to propound a consistent theory out of the tangled skein of these apparently disconnected strands of thought and the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana accomplished the miracle by a singular stroke of genius.

Ānandavardhana took his firm stand on the foundation of *rasa* set up by Bharata. Applying the criteria of potencies propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas, he found them totally inadequate to explain the experience of *rasa*, which was *sui generis*. Neither the primary nor the secondary usages of words could in themselves explain *rasa* (not even *tātparya*). A third potency which shines through them and yet rises above them had to be postulated to explain *rasa*. But the difficulty

was that if everyday language could implicitly convey affective meaning or the speaker's intent, and if philosophers found no necessity of postulating a third linguistic function, in poetry too there would be no scientific basis for such a postulate. Ānandavardhana was up against all the currents of traditional thought in this respect. Yet he boldly vindicated that meaning in poetry was primarily *rasa*, a thing quite different from the speaker's intent or affective meaning in life. *Rasa*, the *sine qua non* of poetry, could be realized only through the poet's conformity to aesthetic principles imposed by it, and could be felt only by men of cultivated taste. The principle of unity of *rasa* and its implications had never before been explained so pointedly.

The Grammarians' term *dhvani* came in handy to Ānandavardhana while designating this revealing or aesthetic function of language, exclusively found in poetry. He called every good poem, taken as a whole, *dhvani*. The individual words would never cease to have their primary and secondary senses; but they would only serve as means to the end of aesthetic significance. In poetry, then, the suggestive function was not confined to words but extended even to primary and secondary meanings on the one hand and to every aspect of poetic technique on the other.

No doubt the earlier writers on poetics had shown vaguely their awareness of these considerations in their ideas of *guṇa*, *alaṁkāra*, *rīti*, etc. Ānandavardhana's complaint against them is that they never cared to distinguish between the pre-eminent and the perfunctory, between the means and the end. He judges that their *artha-alaṁkāra* can only mean "embellishment of subject" and "subject" can denote only an "idea," not *rasa*. So interpreted, all *alaṁkāras* become mere beautifiers (only extraneous ornamental figures of speech), the beautified element being the poetic idea, and not *rasa*. This involves logically the pre-eminence of primary meaning, though by definition the presence of *rasa* cannot be overlooked in any instance of poetry. Ānandavardhana admits that such instances of poetry too might prove popular and assigns them a second place in his scheme of classification. First-rate poetry is only that wherein the pre-eminence of *rasa* is assuredly *felt* by the man of taste. If in a pedantic piece the effect of *rasa* is all but lost, it is, strictly speaking, no poetry; it is but *citra* or word-spinning.

Thus, in Ānandavardhana's review of early poetics, we have a dual role assigned to figures of speech: as promoters of *rasa* and as important in themselves. One is the way of genius; and the other of talent. Both

are desirable; but the first is better. Nor is this all. The area of *dhvani* in Ānandavardhana's opinion is wider than that of *rasa* also. It includes in its wide domain the limitless field of poetic ideas (*vastu*) and also figures which are not directly stated, but indirectly implied. The obliquely suggested idea and figurative idea come to be ranked on a par with *rasa-dhvani* itself, when felt as pre-eminent, because in Ānandavardhana's opinion there is nothing that is not raised to the rank of pure poetry by the magic touch of *dhvani* or the aesthetic function. In this light all the earlier canons of poetics gain a new significance.

The influence of Ānandavardhana's theory of *dhvani* was far-reaching in the history of Indian literary criticism. It provided the much-needed corrective in shaping the taste of Sanskrit literary critics. In Indian criticism, appreciation of the underlying tone of a poem as a whole unit, in which all the elements of technique have their share to contribute, is a truth which found its first spokesman in Ānandavardhana. His work contains hundreds of striking examples from the very best in Sanskrit poetry which serve to establish his theory of *dhvani*. His analysis of the nature of meaning in poetry appears to be substantially sound even by modern standards.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

II: AN ENGLISH APPROACH

So MUCH has been written, in both Britain and America, about the nature of meaning in poetry, that before one can say anything fresh on the subject it becomes necessary to lop off some of the dead wood of argument and cut away some of the surrounding verbiage in order to establish a starting point for further discussion.

For instance, it is a popular opening gambit of many critics to isolate Coleridge's famous remark that "Poetry gives most pleasure when only generally and not perfectly understood," and then to use it as an excuse for an attack upon Romantic criticism as a whole, making Romantic poets and critics responsible for the "exclusion of meaning from poetry" by their insistence upon "magic" and incantation. Yet when we examine the complete text of *Anima Poetae*, from which the above extract is taken, we find that Coleridge actually said something rather different:

> When no criticism is pretended to, and the Mind in its simplicity gives itself up to a Poem as to a work of nature, Poetry gives most pleasure when only generally and not perfectly understood.

As Mr. Humphry House pointed out in his Clark Lectures on Coleridge,

> the implications of the sentence are almost completely reversed; for it means that when criticism *is* pretended to, then the pleasure follows in proportion to the understanding. The sentence can no longer be enrolled to support a view of poetry as a kind of vague magic.

Similarly, in *English Poetry: A Critical Introduction* Mr. F. W. Bateson ascribes what he calls the "Pure Sound" and "Suggestion" theories of poetry to the Romantics (citing Bridges, Housman, and Abercrombie in evidence) and sets them carefully up as Aunt Sallies, before proceeding to knock them down again with his supposedly devastating statement that "Romantic poetry died of old age many years ago and it is more than time that Romantic criticism also received its decent and final interment." Nevertheless, there are Romantic critics of much higher standing than Bridges and Company who would insist, just as strongly as Mr. Bateson, upon the necessity of meaning in poetry.

There are critics who have suggested that since poetry is made up of words and sentences, like ordinary conversation and other forms of writing, it can hardly be regarded as a special medium. "There is no sharp division between poetic language and everyday speech, nor even between poetic language and that of science," observes Professor Schlauch in *Modern English and American Poetry* — "Both are gradation and nuances within one and the same medium of communication. . . ." To my mind, this is to over-emphasize the obvious similarities to such an extent as to obscure the disparity between two entirely different methods of thought and two entirely different manipulations of language, and to ignore the fact that in the organization of experience which the creation of poetry demands it is essential to maintain control of the material by means of poetic forms of one kind or another. Myths, symbols, images, and the whole poetic framework, etc., are as much a part of the meaning of poetry as the actual words used; indeed, they give depth to the words, and multiplicity of meaning to the whole. Form and content in poetry are inseparable. To demonstrate the truth of this, one has only to transpose such poems as "The Ancient Mariner" and "Four Quartets," or such plays as *Hamlet* and *The Family Reunion,* into

another medium — they immediately lose their original value and, however enlightening the results may be, become something very different from what they were. As for the language of science, Professor Schlauch may be interested to learn that the scientists themselves have invented a mathematical language almost incomprehensible to the layman in order to convey their theories with greater precision. The poet must grapple with the complexities of his age through the medium of words which have already accumulated a weight of meaning from centuries of human experience and yet, on the other hand, he must exploit the resources of language by whatsoever means lie within his power, so that his poetry will adequately express his own response to life. If he is successful he may add new associations and values to the words he uses. In this way poetic tradition is continually being extended.

Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not concerned here with the defence of Romantic criticism — but I do think it is important to distinguish between an objective approach to the subject and what may turn out to be mere axe-grinding.

One of the difficulties to be encountered in any discussion of meaning in poetry is that there is no clear and generally accepted idea of what it is that constitutes poetry. At various times in the past poetry has been described as imitation of human life, a glimpse of the divine, an expression of emotion, aspiration towards beauty, and communication of pleasure; but such definitions tell us little about its real nature. Where, for instance, would one draw the line between prose, poetic prose, prose poems, verse, and poetry? There are those who go to the other extreme and suggest that poetry exists only in the individual reaction to a piece of literature or to spoken words, that it is something produced by the poet in accordance with his own formula in such a way as to call forth a response in other people; but this would not explain why there is such a marked agreement of opinion amongst readers of all periods and societies as to the quality of certain poems written in the past.

Life as we know it consists of a vast number of experiences of every kind, experiences which appear to be quite unrelated and without any sort of pattern. It seems to me that, by selection, rearrangement and emphasis, the poet attempts to find some kind of pattern or meaning in this mass of human experience; and because he is in closer touch with reality than most of us, and has learned how to use his senses properly, he can help us to enjoy, or at least gain something from, the actual experiences we have ourselves. A good poem may provide us with fresh

perceptions of both the internal and external worlds, and of their inter-relationship, as well as a new understanding of human behaviour. For an effective working definition of a poem, then, I would refer those who may be interested to Mr. Robin Skelton's *The Poetic Pattern*. A poem, says Mr. Skelton, "is a pattern that reveals completely one particular aspect of life, so that one may, in knowing that pattern, realize that aspect of life more fully." In other words, poetry is a pattern of experience revealed in a series of words dynamically related to one another, which reflect, in their structure and inter-relationship, the poet's and the reader's recognition in one experience of something basic to the nature of all experience. In writing a poem, the poet seeks to present the pattern, not only of the specific subject of the poem, but of the whole atmosphere surrounding his apprehension of that subject.

How, then, does the poet achieve this pattern of experience? Poems can be created in many ways. It may be that a given subject will arouse a line of thought; odd lines and phrases which come into the mind may set up an interaction of thought and imagery; and even a sudden isolated image, apparently from nowhere in particular, may serve as a starting point for the poem. But, whatever the method, there must be some formal organization of experience.

It follows that meaning in poetry presupposes a poet, a reader or listener, and some communication between the two. Whether the poet belongs to a comparatively static period or to an age in which new discoveries and knowledge are rapidly changing man's outlook, the problem is always the fundamental one of language. Yet, though he may use the same words as those of ordinary conversation, or of other forms of writing, he uses them in a completely different way. He is not attempting to provide a clear set of simplified directions such as those a policeman might give to help us reach our immediate destination safely; still less is he concerned with presenting a philosophical treatise, logically worked out. His task is to present a pattern of complex experience which will reveal a multiplicity of meaning, and he does it by the use of poetic form in which myth, symbol, imagery, paradox, parallel, and irony all play their various parts. To deal with this subject as thoroughly as it deserves, it would be necessary to trace the development of poetry back to the myth-creating period, but space limitations preclude such a study here. As language developed, the earliest myths (or meaning in poetry, if you will) grew out of primitive man's urge to account for the universe and the processes of nature, to identify himself with them and the mys-

terious forces over which he could exercise no control. They fulfilled a vital function as links between man and his environment and enabled him to distinguish some kind of meaning in his everyday activities, thereby satisfying his religious instincts as well as his need for a pattern of living. Indeed, the symbols of both religion and creative art derive from the same source; and in the first poetry of which we have any knowledge the two types of symbol are almost inseparable.

Here, then, is the reason for the difficulty many readers have in understanding contemporary poetry. In weakening the foundations of religious belief in the latter part of the nineteenth century, science devalued what for earlier periods had been a stable currency in religious symbolism, and deprived the poet of the traditional pattern of values by which his experience of both inner and outer worlds could be integrated and conveyed to his public. Consequently, in the endeavour to find a genuine myth, or even to re-state orthodox beliefs, for their own age and situation, some modern poets have frequently resorted to the use of private symbols; symbols which may or may not lend themselves to a wider application than that offered by the poems in which they occur. The poets are not entirely to blame for this tendency. When their creative values are so much in conflict with the mechanical values of present-day civilization as is so clearly evident, there is some justification for their refusal to compromise and for their reliance solely upon their own experience and apprehension of reality. Living at a time when materialistic aims provide the main incentive to human action, when political programmes have failed to accomplish any semblance of unity amongst mankind and ideologies have distorted the meaning of such words as "love," "freedom," "loyalty," "good," and "evil," when religion has lost the driving force it once had and science, the great assurance of the nineteenth century, is moving into realms of increasing uncertainty, on what else can they depend and still preserve their artistic integrity?

Isolated as he is by this conflict of values, the modern poet's task of discovering a valid myth, or re-stating old truths in an effective form for his own time, is difficult enough, but it is made even more complex by the fact that society itself, industrialized, herded into cities and its activities regulated by mechanical processes, no longer has an organic basis. Without a religious focus, out of harmony with the rhythmic life of nature, vacillating between memories of the last war and fear of the next, morally rootless and drifting upon the tide of current events, but desperately craving some spiritual certainty, it has lost touch with the

sources of creative energy by which its values might be renewed. The poet today has to be something of a psycho-analyst in order to reach the level of the mind at which he can make contact with his potential public.

In this situation the poet has, nevertheless, a special responsibility, since he is directly concerned with the underlying realities of life, as distinct from its superficial appearances, and draws upon the source from which all spiritual values derive for his creative power. He acts as a spokesman for his fellows, sensing their most vital needs before they have been fully apprehended, though he may remain quite unaware of performing this function, and may even deny that it has any part in his craft. Though individual poets here and there may still appear to be engrossed in cultivating private gardens of their own, it would be fair to say that, on the whole, poets today clearly recognize their responsibility to society and have accepted the specific challenge of their time. Values do not exist *in vacuo*: to have any meaning for mankind they must be applied to thought, motive, and behaviour. Whatever virtue the inner life may possess, it must at some stage be related to the outside world of action and event if it is to have a vital influence.

Yet it will not suffice for poets merely to superimpose classical myths and symbols upon contemporary material in the same forms as those in which they have been handed down to us, for the simple reason that the ancient myths, as such, no longer have roots in the everyday life of the people — if they are to be of any assistance today they will have to be rejuvenated and given new relevance for this mechanical age. Similarly, if the solution lies in a return to religious values, as some poets believe, it can be achieved only through a re-interpretation of those values and their extension to every area of human activity, and a re-affirmation of man's spiritual nature, continually adapted to meet current needs at the same time as it expresses truths revealed in the past. Whatever synthesis of old and new, of inner and outer experience, may eventually be reached, it is certain that science cannot be excluded, but will make its proper contribution to the meaning of poetry and to the pattern of values which emerges.

HOWARD SERGEANT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

[THE FIRST PART of **Shri S. Subhash Chandra**'s long study of Martin Heidegger appeared in our March 1963 issue. Below we print the second; a third and concluding part will appear in June.—ED.]

II

HEIDEGGER, then, sets himself on the road to the enquiry concerning Being. But, unlike other European philosophers who were wont to deal with this problem in an ivory tower of abstractions, Heidegger is resolved to introduce concreteness here too. He is convinced that Being (which, strictly speaking, implies Essence) can only be approached in terms of the world of objects. Being implies the essence of something. If we want to know what Being is, then we ought to work our way to it by way of undertaking an enquiry into the nature and essence of some being belonging to the world of objects. And Heidegger resolves to unravel the quintessence of Being by means of initiating an enquiry into the meaning of *Dasein*. *Dasein*, i.e., the human being as such, investigated in terms of its essential nature, maintains Heidegger, will offer us a clue to the understanding of Being. We have here an ontological investigation — and not a sociological or psychological one — into the essential structure of *Dasein*. The word *Dasein* implies, literally speaking "to-be-there." In its current usage, it connotes "existence," "life," and "presence." Heidegger uses it as equivalent to "human being as such." He conveys to it a deepened significance. Rightly has Vincent Vycinas observed:

> Primarily *Dasein* for Heidegger is the presence of Being in concrete life and situations. Man is the only being who has an understanding of Being, therefore, only for man can Being be present. Man is the place of the presence of Being; he is this presence. Man is *Dasein*. *Dasein* is not identical with empirical man, but is rather his essence.[1]

The outstanding feature of *Dasein*, according to Heidegger, is to be traced in the precedence of its *existentia* over its *essentia*. *Dasein*, unlike other forms of life and matter, is not available merely as an object of perception, but is distinguished by the property of being able to project himself in various forms of being. An enquiry into the nature

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[1] VINCENT VYCINAS: *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1961), p. 25.

of *Dasein,* opines Heidegger, should not merely ask, "what" it is, but also "how" it is. Indeed, the question should be so formulated as to bring the primacy of the manner in which *Dasein* exists into bold relief. For *Dasein* is no mere bundle of attributes. It is capable of influencing the manner in which its attributes express themselves. Man (i.e., *Dasein*) alone exists. Other forms of life and matter subsist; but they do not exist. "Man alone exists. The rock is, but does not exist. The tree is, but does not exist. The horse is, but does not exist. God is, but he does not exist."[2] The essence of *Dasein,* then, is subordinate to its existence.

The second hallmark of *Dasein,* avers Heidegger, is constituted in the fact that it is *invariably my own* being. *Dasein* is conceivable only in terms of the personal pronoun. It is articulated in expressions like "I am," "You are," etc. This feature of "my-ness" (*Jemeinigkeit*) is no subsidiary attribute of *Dasein,* but belongs to its very basic structure. Further, *Dasein* is my own being in no merely possessive sense of the word. It is my own being in so far as it determines the possibilities of my existence. And these possibilities of my existence are peculiarly my own possibilities.[3]

Dasein, then, exists, and it exists in an existentially personal manner. And how does *Dasein* exist? It exists in so far as it happens to-be-in-the-world (*in-der-Welt-sein*). To-be-in-the-world incarnates one of the fundamental existential features of *Dasein. Dasein* happens to-be-in-the-world not in the same sense in which things happen to be in some area of space or other, e.g., a bench happens to lie in an auditorium, and the auditorium is located in a university, and the university is situated in a city. Indeed, *Dasein* is existentially incapable of existing in this manner. This does not signify that it is bodily incapable of being in the world just as clothes hang in the wardrobe. It can and it does present itself in this manner in the world. The bodily appearance of *Dasein,* however, is secondary and subservient to its existential being. *Dasein* happens to-be-in-the-world in so far as it lives and is familiar with the world.[4] The physical presence of *Dasein* in the world, asserts Heidegger, takes place, because to-be-in-the-world constitutes the *a-priori* structure of it, and not *vice versa.* In short,*Dasein* without the facet of to-be-in-

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[2] MARTIN HEIDEGGER: *Was ist Metaphysik* (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1961), p. 14.

[3] HEIDEGGER: *Sein und Zeit,* p. 42.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 54.

the-world, which *a priori* and necessarily belongs to it, is as inconceivable as a triangle without three angles. Further, even the merely physical existence of *Dasein* is different from the lifeless presence of a piece of rock within the spatial framework. *Dasein* in its bodily form is *factually* present in the world, in so far as it is "fatefully" linked to all forms of life and matter that confront him within the world.[5] Hence, this *facticity* serves to express one of the features of to-be-in-the-world. Cognition (*Erkennen*), a mode of *Dasein,* is another outcome of to-be-in-the-world.

An important element of the thought of Heidegger is his analysis of the nature of the world of non-human objects (*Seiendes*), which he prefers to characterize as "at-handness" (*Zuhandenheit*) as against the "presence" (*Vorhandensein*) of *Dasein*. The world of non-human objects, we are told, is akin to the nature of a tool (*Zeug*). It, in all its manifold variety, is available to us as a tool for use. The world of objects (*Seiendes*) places itself at our disposal. It serves us. Shoes are to be worn and the watch serves to keep us in touch with the passage of time. Not merely are the tools themselves implements for the use of *Dasein,* but they are also capable of manufacturing other tools. Hammer, leather, and nails serve as material for the manufacture of shoes. The world of tools is characterized by a "referential manifold" (*Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit*), for an interrelationship of tools is discernible. Thus, for instance, pen, ink, paper, pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, and the room are meaningfully interrelated to one another. Their relationship stems from their very nature as tools. The room is no mere geometrical shape "within four walls," but is a dwelling place. In truth every one of these tools is the outcome of no blind response to the neighbouring tools, but issues from the need for the fulfilment of some purpose connected with their referential totality.[6]

Heidegger continues his analysis of the nature of the world of tools by elucidating their nature in the form of spatiality. All tools, as we have already pointed out, are essentially "at-hand." They are at our disposal. And, if they are to be "at-hand," then they must be "in the neighbourhood," i.e., they must possess the character of proximity (*Nähe*). This proximity, however, is not to be understood merely in terms of feet and yards. It signifies the availability of tools for use and exploitation. It means that every tool has its own place (*Platz*) assigned to it. The tool belongs to this place, and does not just lie around. Indeed, all

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.

tools find themselves in a region (*Gegend*) characteristic of them. And these regions are not to be understood in terms of the spatial geometry. Tools belong to specific regions by virtue of their relevance to daily intercourse. In a certain context, "above" means "on the blanket," "under" signifies "upon the floor," and "behind" connotes "near the door." None of these expressions would carry any sense at all without the related referential context. However, it would be erroneous to assume that these regions are constituted by juxtaposition of certain available things. On the contrary, these regions are already present at their own places. Thus, the sun, whose light and heat are manifest in everyday life, has its own assigned places: dawn, midday, dusk, and midnight. Finally, all these regions are characterized by a remarkable unobtrusive familiarity (*unauffällige Vertrautheit*). All these regions are so very familiar to us that their presence, to say nothing of their significance, never makes any discernible impact on our thoughts. Indeed, these regions become conspicuous only by their absence. Their absence, should it occur, would startle us, and we would thereby become aware of them.[7]

Heidegger turns his attention now to an illumination of the spatiality of *Dasein*. *Dasein*'s spatiality is to be understood in so far as it happens to-be-in-the-world. Only in this context can we hope to elucidate the import of space for *Dasein*. We are struck by the relentless persistence with which *Dasein* strives to abrogate the barriers of distance. *Dasein* yearns for proximity. He seeks to overcome distance and the separation entailed by it. With the help of supersonic aviation he aims at surmounting distance. Radio serves to foster contact at great distances and thereby promotes the basic urge towards proximity, which is palpable in *Dasein*. Further, *Dasein* attempts not merely to abbreviate distance, but also circumspectly imparts to it the appropriate direction (*Ausrichtung*) in which this proximity shall take place. As a matter of fact, Heidegger tells us, it is this concern for the proper guidance of the urge towards proximation that enables us to appreciate properly the significance of "left" and "right." As a result, we take care to suit our gloves, which perforce have to adjust themselves to the movements of our hands, to the right or the left hand. As against this, we do not have a hammer for the right hand and a hammer for the left hand, but one hammer for both hands. In this, *Dasein* ascribes both to the gloves and to the hammer the significance appropriate to their nearness to it.[8]

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 102–4.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 104–10.

Spatiality is discovered in the phenomenon of to-be-in-the-world, which is constitutive of *Dasein*. In the unobtrusiveness (*Unauffälligkeit*) of the world of external things, spatiality becomes accessible to *Dasein*. Space is "in" the world in so far as *Dasein* is possesive of the attribute of to-be-in-the-world. For *Dasein* is spatial. In other words, by virtue of the *a-priori* spatial character of *Dasein* space obtains its *a-priori* status in the world. If, however, we ignore this dependence — existential dependence — of *Dasein* on his being-in-the-world (the expression being-in-the-world coincides with to-be-in-the-world), then we reduce the surrounding world to mere dimension. We divest thereby the world of tools of its referential totality and allow it to degrade itself into the status of a manifold of arbitrary things. The world stands depleted of its perspective, and our surroundings (*Umwelt*) degenerate into a sterile world of nature. The world is "spatialized" to such an extent that it becomes a mere totality of extended things. The result is a de-world-ing (*Entweltlichung*) of the world. The burden of Heidegger's approach, then, is to stress the need for conceiving space with reference to the phenomenon of to-be-in-the-world of DASEIN.[9]

Heidegger applies himself next to an extensive analysis of the phenomenon of to-be-in-the-world. *Dasein*, as we have already pointed out, is invariably "my own being." It is no abstract, ethereal existent. It is concretely, i.e., in a uniquely personal manner, my own being. And this concrete invariably "my own being" does not stand alone and insulated in an ivory tower. It rather exists with others in the world. *Dasein* implies not merely to-be-in-the-world, but also "being-with-others" (*Mitsein mit Anderen*) in the world. And the "others" here does not coincide with everything apart from me. The "others" here denotes forms of being from whom I mostly do not distinguish my own *Dasein*. In other words, if refers to *Daseins* (for the purpose of simplification *Dasein* may be understood to refer to the human being as such) other than my own *Dasein*. As a matter of fact, my own *Dasein* is inconceivable without the *Dasein* of others, for my own being entails necessarily being with others. This conception, however, ought not to be understood as an ontic statement. It does not merely imply that *Dasein* involves being-with-others, because *factually* I do not exist without the members of my species. This is rather an existential statement, which asserts that being-with-others belongs to *Dasein as such* and not as a mere attribute it is invested with by its intercourse with the surrounding world. Heidegger

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–12.

substantiates this view by stating that even if other members of the species of *Dasein* were not there, *Dasein* would still remain an existent involving being-with-others. Even in solitariness (*Alleinsein*) being-with-others is patently present, for the latter is the most compelling proof of the possibility of the former.[10] In our care (*Fürsorge*) for the welfare of others, we affirm and articulate the concept of being-with-others as an existential feature of our very being. And our care for the welfare of others is guided by the modes of consideration (*Rücksicht*) and forbearance (*Nachsicht*).[11]

S. Subhash Chandra

(*To be concluded*)

GOLD IN THE DUSK

Gold in the dusk warm windows glow
Alone I walk through deepening grey
God breathes to me from the giving earth
He floats jewelled light above my way
And in my separateness I know
That every death must yield new birth

Dorothy Ellin Flax

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 114–20.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

WAR ON WANT AND THE BHOODAN MOVEMENT OF INDIA

[**Miss Olwen Battersby**, a founder-member of the North London Branch of War on Want, writes about this eleven-year-old organization's co-operation with the Bhoodan Movement to aid *gramdan* villages to become self-sufficient. This effort is a glad symptom of the fact that race and national barriers are being slowly overcome by the realization that all men are brothers and each man must be to some extent his brother's keeper.—ED.]

DIRECT AID to the destitute *gramdan* (communally owned) villages of rural India by towns, villages, and groups in Britain: this project is put forward by War on Want as part of the United Nations Freedom from Hunger Campaign, launched in this country by the Duke of Edinburgh on 27 June 1962. In association with the Bhoodan Movement of Vinoba Bhave in India the scheme aims to build up village economy in accordance with the Gandhian concept of village democracy; to promote a social and economic revolution which could spread throughout the underdeveloped world; to create links of brotherhood and partnership between Britain, India, and the world.

Man today faces the harsh facts of a divided world and an explosive population. At each tick of the clock there is one more mouth to feed on this earth; at every third tick one baby dies of starvation. Two out of three citizens of our world — one and a half billion people — are undernourished, cannot read or write, die too young. Six hundred million hungry children shiver.

Within Man's reach, for the first time in history, is power unlimited. He has radiation, mechanization, automation on his side. He can water the deserts of the Tropics, and heat the frozen North. He has power to destroy himself; power also to bring fullness of life to this planet.

Against this background of acute poverty yet startling possibility, the Bhoodan Movement offers a way forward. To the world it provides the first case in history of a landlord-ridden state carrying out a voluntary distribution of land unaided by the capital usually needed for compensation. Through the pooling of land and the abolition of property rights it can gradually prepare the nation for the passage from individual to co-operative farming. As such it has significance extending far beyond the coastline of India and could well become the classic example to guide policies throughout the underdeveloped world.

To India, where it is estimated that when the present cycle of governmental plans comes to an end in 1976 the average income of her four hundred and fifty million people will still be no more than £40, it offers new hope and a sense of purpose.

"We in India are working under Vinoba Bhave in what is known as Sarvodaya Movement of which Bhoodan or land-gift is a principal part," wrote Devendra Kumar Gupta, Editor of the official organ of the Bhoodan Movement of the State of Madhya Pradesh, in a letter to War on Want, 8 December 1961. *Sarvodaya* literally means "Good of All"; it implies the welfare of the lowliest and the lost by means which elevate everybody. Thus War on Want and Sarvodaya are directed to the same aim." Both movements are in their infancy: eleven years old. The one seeks to promote international distribution of the world's resources for the benefit of the poorer nations; the other, the sharing of land, property, and wealth between the landlord and the landless within the nation itself.

It was on the morning of 18 April 1951, that the Bhoodan Movement was born in India — later to culminate in the wide-spread *Gramdan* of today. It happened in the beautiful village of Pochempelli, in the country of Telengana. Confronted with the plight of forty landless untouchable families Ram Chandra made his famous offer. "Sir, I am ready to give." "How much?" asked Vinoba quietly. "As much as you need. . . ." He took a dirty piece of paper and signed away a hundred acres.

The unbelievable went on happening. Vinoba, lean, stringy, frail but seemingly tireless, with expressive eyes and the straggly wispy beard of a prophet, has now walked more than fifty thousand miles in his campaign to persuade the landlords of India to part with their land for redistribution among the landless peasants. From people of all classes and denominations, from Hindus and Muslims, rich and poor, Harijans and Brahmins, land has been given — the donors come from all political parties and walks of life. Bhoodan, Vinoba believes, is a phènomenon inspired by God: "How, otherwise, all this giving?" he asks.

"Hands off please! Land is neither yours nor mine. . . . It is God's who made it. Whoever shall work at it shall enjoy its fruits." These are the words of Vinoba. He is still on the march; still seeking the villagization of land. Today six thousand villages, two thousand in Orissa, one thousand in Assam, others in Madras, Kerala, Maharashtra, and elsewhere have adopted *Gramdan,* i.e., have shed private ownership of

land. Each owns everything. One village; one family.

Vinoba is out to build a new social order. He explains:

> We want an order of society which will be free not only from exploitation but also from every governmental authority. The power of Government will be decentralized and distributed among the villages. Every village will be the State in itself: the centre will have only nominal authority over them. In this way, gradually, we will reach a stage when authority in every form will have become unnecessary and will, therefore, fade away giving rise to a perfectly free society.

Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, formerly leader of the Praja Socialist Party, who retired from politics to devote himself to Bhave's cause, was in London recently. Questioned concerning the Bhoodan concept of decentralized power, he replied:

> Yes, in the non-violent society power is as widely dispersed as possible . . . theoretically at least, every village should be in a position to do all that it can do for itself by its own resources. There are many things which it can't do, for which villages should work together. Then we come to the district level where in India the population is anywhere from 1,000,000 to 5,000,000. . . . Then maybe there are things which they can't do also, then those things should be dealt with at a still higher level by a number of districts coming together, and then we come to the state level.

In India he explained, at present:

> At the bottom there is very little to do, everything is concentrated at the top. We are trying to reverse this and overturn the pyramid, so that it stands on its base.

It is with these principles in mind that the individual village is created. To quote Vinoba again:

> As an example in a village of a hundred families, each family will be represented by one person. The hundred persons will form the general village council. It will meet once a month. The council unanimously nominates ten to fifteen persons who will form the committee. The committee will meet more often, and will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the village. Within each village the family holds the land in trusteeship; it cannot be sold, mortgaged, rented or left fallow. If uncultivated, it goes back into the common pool.

To Vinoba the Movement is either the first step toward a total revolution in society, a revolution through love, or it is nothing. "Redis-

tribution of land in a village is only the first step," he reiterates. "Our movement aims at creating a new man, not only in India but also all over the world. It is world-wide in its implications." "*Jai Hind,*" Victory to India, says the Indian; "*Jai Jagat,*" Victory to the world, says Vinoba.

These are the villages for which War on Want is now appealing. Today in partnership with the Bhoodan Movement towns, villages, societies, schools, and churches may link hands with rural India across the ever-widening gap between themselves and the hungry countries of the underdeveloped world.

They may "adopt" a *gramdan* (communally owned) village, contact the village committee, watch the village grow.

They may endow a well or small-scale irrigation scheme — pure water leading to better crops, better health and hygiene, and so to education and community life.

They may supply bullocks, cottage industries, farm equipment, schools, clinics.

Above all, they may release the creative energy of the indigenous people. India is a land of over half a million villages. Eighty per cent of Indians live in villages. She has a population increasing by eight millions annually. At this moment of history large-scale mechanization is not for her. *Gramdan* village development prevents disruption of long-established custom, promotes employment, and is in accord with the strong village-family tradition of the Indian people.

Approximately £450 is needed, it is reckoned, to put each village on its feet and make it independent of outside aid. This target can be reached by stages: £38 for farm equipment, credit fund, cottage industries, or the maintenance of a village worker: £150 for the village well or better animals.

The architect of this plan is Donald Groom, a Quaker with sixteen years' experience in Indian village-development work, including four years with Vinoba. "I know these villages; I know the people very intimately indeed," he told War on Want recently. "It is because of this experience that I feel so confident that if you want to help the development of India, then this is the way."

Small sums in India mean so much. The Indian peasant, unable to follow his craft during the monsoon period, borrowed money to stay alive. He was charged 40, 50, and even 75 per cent interest. £38 — 500 rupees — a recurring fund from which to borrow and pay back without

interest, could mean security from the moneylender for one whole village community. £450 could mean new water, new crops, new health, and new hope — life itself for one impoverished Indian village.

Help given to these villages by the people of Britain as their contribution to the United Nations Freedom from Hunger Campaign will be channelled on this side through War on Want, 9 Madeley Road, Ealing, London w. 5. On the Indian side the All-India Sarva Seva Sangh (Bhoodan Headquarters) has taken responsibility for directing aid to particular villages, arranging liaison between the "pockets of *gramdan* villages" and towns and groups in Britain, providing the names of villages, and where possible maps and pictorial material, reporting progress. Shri Siddharaj Dhadda, a leading member of the Sarva Seva Sangh and formerly Finance Minister of the Rajasthan Government, when discussing the scheme, said:

> We in India have to conquer poverty and disease; we have to make up for centuries of neglect. These problems can be faced only if people work together in a co-operative way; sharing what they have got, sharing what they have not got, sharing not only their joys but also their sorrows.

But the Bhoodan Movement, he continued, had a vision beyond the villages. It looked to the whole country, and beyond the country of India to the whole world. The salvation of man depended on human brotherhood, and unless we solved our problems peaceably and with understanding the world might well destroy itself. Valuable as was the material help, still more valuable would be the human relationship — the links which together we might be able to forge between India, Britain, and the world.

The first district chosen for adoption was a destitute area in Assam, consisting of some forty villages, in the centre of which is Maitre Ashram (Friendship Centre). Within the first month of the launching of the Campaign by the Duke of Edinburgh these forty villages were earmarked: a town in the North of England has taken for its target the support of twenty-two of these villages; another in the Home Counties eighteen — thus making the whole area self-sufficient. War on Want hopes to support ten such areas. A Welsh refugee organization, a well-known Public School, a Rotary Club, a Synagogue, a Co-operative Society Branch are among the organizations seeking to channel their aid to the Campaign through the Bhoodan Movement of India.

From its earliest days War on Want has been deeply conscious of the needs of India. It has given financial support to orphanages, schools,

homes; provided wells and clinics; initiated a milk distribution scheme; supplied X-ray and air-conditioners to hospitals, jeeps to jungle clinics, and supported a foot-clinic and "cobblers' shop" for leprosy patients. A factory so made that it can employ both the leper and the physically handicapped, and a "Cobalt Bomb" for the treatment of cancer: these are among War on Want's present Indian projects. The Statement of Nine Months' Aid, to December 1961, shows that in cash £11,991. 3*s.* 6*d.* was directed to India, a sum which is second only to that for Algerian relief.

But in association with the Bhoodan Movement of Vinoba Bhave War on Want seeks not merely to heal the symptoms of world poverty, but to prevent the disease for all time. "Such is the man who is working a silent revolution," concludes *Acharya Vinoba Bhave,* a booklet issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India: "India is the fortunate field of his activity, but a time may come when the whole world may have to come round to Vinoba's way of thinking."

OLWEN BATTERSBY

CHARITY can have no excess till . . . it is more than that which would lay down its life even for an enemy, till it exceeds that which the first Christians practised, when they had all things common; till it exceeds that of St. John, who requires him that has two coats to give to him that has none, and him that has meat to do likewise; till it is loving our poor brethren more than Christ has loved us; till it goes beyond the command of loving our neighbour as we love ourselves. . . .

—WILLIAM LAW

DR. MESMER

THE RESTORATION OF A REPUTATION

[**Miss Margaret Goldsmith** is an educationist, author, and translator, and has published several books, one of them a biography of Franz Anton Mesmer. Mme. H. P. Blavatsky's vindication of Mesmer is referred to in this fine article: she speaks of him not only as a pioneer of physical and medical science but as an agent of enlightenment, as one whose mission was to draw notice to certain portions of an ancient wisdom in nations where that had been forgotten. We request the reader's attention for the extracts from Mme. Blavatsky's writings which follow the article.—Ed.]

Franz Anton Mesmer is now generally acknowledged as the discoverer of therapeutic methods which finally led to modern medical hypnosis. In 1955, one hundred and forty years after his death, the British Medical Association, so often through the years reluctant to accept new and heterodox ideas, issued a report recommending that hypnosis be taught in medical schools in this country. Today, the quacks who for generations abused Mesmer's ideas and brought his name into disrepute are forgotten. He has been rehabilitated, and no one, not even the most conservative medical men, doubts the sincerity with which Mesmer tried, though gropingly, to find a rational explanation for the successful cures of many of his patients.

In the 1760's, when Mesmer qualified as a physican in Vienna and began to practise, the conception of mental suggestion or auto-suggestion, or of the power of the mind over the body, was still a very long way ahead. It was not surprising therefore that Mesmer, influenced by the "reasonable," eighteenth-century rejection of mystical or religious explanations of strange cures, tried to find a rational reason for his patients' recovery. He came to believe that he could supply what he called "animal magnetism" to steel, wood, trees, water, paper, or other objects, which then emanated a healing force or *fluidum* when directed towards or brought into contact with his patients. Later, after he settled and began practising in Paris in 1778, he was convinced that he himself could transmit the healing magnetism, and he often touched the sick with his own hands. But as his practice grew, he no longer had time for this personal laying on of his hands, and he made use of his famous *baquet*. This *baquet* was a circular wooden trough, about a foot high, round which twenty or thirty persons could be "magnetized" simul-

taneously. At the bottom of the trough, Mesmer spread out a layer of iron filings which he had magnetized with his own hands.

Despite years of experience Mesmer's method remained practically unchanged. Nor did he develop his ideas except in one respect: he had learned that the healing *fluidum* was not effective unless the patient co-operated with him, the physician. He called this physician-patient relationship the *rapport*. Thus, a century before the therapeutic effects of suggestion were fully recognized, Mesmer had understood instinctively the necessity of a correlation of the minds of the patient and the physician. Had he himself appreciated the far-reaching implications of his *rapport* theory, or had it been studied sooner by other medical men, his reputation would have been established decades before his methods were at last seriously considered. Mesmer's fate, however, was that of many pioneers, and his work was discredited for generations by medical men and by laymen.

There were several reasons why the scientific world lost interest in Mesmer during his later years and after his death in 1815 at the age of 81. Physicians everywhere, and particularly in France, where Mesmer lived until the outbreak of the Revolution, were dominated by "science," by new theories and "systems," and they vigorously opposed any suggestion that the mind could in any way influence bodily functions, an idea which, as men of science, they associated with mediaeval superstitions. For the Age of Reason, the eighteenth century, was resolute in its efforts to overcome the belief in magic and sorcery, of preceding centuries, and was, as A. N. Whitehead so wisely remarked, an "age of one-eyed reason, deficient in its wisdom and its depth." Nor can one, in all fairness, reproach Mesmer's contemporaries for their short-sightedness. One age could hardly have contributed both the steam-engine and a deeper understanding of Mesmer's theories, which even to him remained tantalizingly obscure.

Unfortunately not all the physicians who opposed Mesmer were prompted by their enthusiasm for the "new" science. In Paris, at any rate, his colleagues' rejection of his theories was based on their jealousy of his large practice and his increasing prestige, especially among wealthy, aristocratic patients. Finally the powerful Medical Faculty of the University of Paris not only repudiated Mesmer himself, but excluded from the profession, and withdraw their licences to practise, from any doctor who had anything to do with Mesmer or his cures. The propaganda organized by the Medical Faculty against Mesmer soon made

itself felt. On the Paris stage a comedy, *Docteur Modern,* ridiculed Mesmer and hinted without great delicacy at the erotic abuses to which his treatments might give rise. News of Mesmer's fall from favour reached England, and here, too, his cures were satirized in a mock announcement about a "Wonderful Magnetizal Elixir" consisting of "4 ounces of chemical oil of fear, dread and terror; and 2 pounds of the rectified spirit of imagination." The announcement concluded:

> Put all these ingredients into a bottle of fancy, digest for several days, and take 40 drops at about nine o'clock in the morning, or a few minutes before you receive a portion of the Magnetic Effluvium. They will make the Effluvium have a surprising effect.

This ridicule gave support to the Medical Faculty's disapproval. Mesmer's position in Paris became increasingly difficult even before the outbreak of the Revolution, during which many of his patients went to the guillotine. Serious medical men, unless they were willing to risk their careers, were now forced to ignore him. So quacks stepped in where the doctors feared to tread, and untrained amateurs, many of them greedy showmen, tried their luck with mesmeric cures. Not surprisingly, these performers distorted Mesmer's teachings beyond recognition, and he and his work were thoroughly discredited.

A very few of these amateur "magnetizers" were serious men who were sincerely concerned with Mesmer's theories. Some of them went a step forward towards an understanding of his discovery, but usually these amateurs themselves did not realize how important was their own contribution, which was then merely abused by the quacks. There was, for example, Count Maximus de Puységur, a respected landowner, who applied mesmerism to cure his peasants' illnesses. Puységur had sufficient insight to appreciate that the somnambulistic state of some "magnetized" patients could not be disregarded. This was a vital landmark on the road to medical hypnotism, but Puységur's concern with somnambulism was not applied medically or studied by doctors for many years. Instead popular mesmerizers exploited the patients' somnambulism, and quacks asserted that in this state patients became clairvoyants and could foretell the future, or diagnose the illness of others by pointing to the affected part of their bodies. One magnetizer, for example, described how one of his patients, a Madame Braun, in the somnambulistic state, diagnosed the illness of another of his patients. Madame Braun, the magnetizer reported, looked through the other patient and saw a huge tapeworm with eyes and huge teeth in the stomach of the sufferer. In her

somnambulistic condition Madame Braun prescribed three fried fox livers as the infallible remedy against the monster.

Progress away from ridiculous quackery of this kind was very slow, but by the time of Mesmer's death some open-minded scientists, especially in France, were moving slowly towards a rational explanation of his cures. J. F. P. Deleuze, to mention one of them, though he still believed in Mesmer's *fluidum*, first drew attention to the will-power of the magnetizer as a vital factor in the achievement of a cure, and a Portuguese Abbot, who had been living in India, Jose Custodio de Faria, in 1819, was the first to concentrate on Mesmer's neglected *rapport* theory. From the point of view of Faria's own age of popular magnetizers, he made a revolutionary suggestion: he claimed that magnetic cures were not brought about by any external fluid, but by the receptive frame of mind of the patient, and that it was the function of the physician to induce in the patient the necessary susceptibility to the physician's influence. "Sleep," he would say quietly to the patient. In Faria's book, *Le Sommeil lucide*, he expressed his surprise that "the human species could have been bizarre enough to seek the cause of cures in a *baquet*, or in some external influence, such as a magnetic fluid."

Faria's investigations, though ignored by showmen-magnetizers, had a certain impact on some medical men. The outstanding doctor to be influenced by Faria's writings was a young Frenchman, Dr. Alexandre Bertrand. Unfortunately Bertrand died at the early age of thirty-one. Had he lived longer Mesmer's reputation might well have been rehabilitated earlier. Oddly enough, in view of Bertrand's intelligence, he still believed in the power of somnambulists to diagnose diseases in others, but his *Traité du Somnambulisme*, published in 1823, shows him to have been the great pioneer of suggestion as a therapeutic agency. He was the first man to express an interest in what we now call the subconscious mind as a vital factor in the cure of mental or nervous disorders. He also grasped the fact that the undercurrents in the minds of apparently healthy people, too, might produce in them phenomena which, heretofore, physicians had studied only in connection with the sick. In other words, Bertrand realized that to gain a thorough understanding of somnambulistic phenomena, the reactions of healthy as well as of sick persons must be investigated. Bertrand had thus moved forward from Mesmer's trial-and-error methods into a clinical, more scientific technique.

A small number of physicians in France were seriously impressed by

Bertrand's work, but the majority refused to take any notice of his clinical approach to mesmerism. On the contrary, a veritable orgy of fantastic mesmerizing in Paris hospitals created a far greater stir than Bertrand's ideas. Doctors in these hospitals used their patients as somnambulist-diagnosticians or as clairvoyants, and many of these doctors, eager to demonstrate their particular somnambulists, showed a cruel disregard of their patients' well-being. These doctor-mesmerizers considered their experiments far more important than the pain or discomfort suffered by the sick. So it was not surprising that a Commission set up by the French Academy in 1826 to investigate these practices in Paris hospitals decided that Mesmer's teachings "had nothing in common with either physiology or therapy." Again Mesmer's teachings were thus officially discredited, and again they were distorted with increasing enthusiasm by clairvoyants, miracle-mongers, and tricksters.

At about this time some magnetizers in France, as well as in Sweden, Germany, and, above all, the United States became increasingly interested in what we now call Spiritualism. These men believed that a person in a somnambulistic state could not only foretell the future or diagnose diseases in others, but could also communicate with the souls of the dead. The early Spiritualists frequently still clung to some of Mesmer's ideas. A German Spiritualist, to cite one example, H. M. Wesermann, was convinced that the "medium and the questioner were connected by a stream of very fine magnetic fluid, finer even than a stream of light." And years later, when a knowledge of electricity was widening, some American Spiritualists interpreted Mesmer's animal magnetism as what they called "Electrical Psychology" or "Electrical Biology."

Two leading religious movements finally emerged, years later, from the fumblings of the early nineteenth-century Spiritualists and mesmerizers; Theosophy and Christian Science.* The former tried to rehabilitate Mesmer's reputation, while the latter repudiated him. For the characters of Madame Blavatsky and Mary Baker Eddy were as different as the movements they founded. Madame Blavatsky, who had been a Spiritualist in her younger days, always most generously acknowledged her debt

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* It should be noted that Madame Blavatsky emphatically protested, as do Theosophists today, against the popular assumption that Theosophy is a religion or sect, or that she was the founder of any such; nor did Theosophy in any sense emerge from spiritualism. In fact, the movement she first made public in 1875 led "an open warfare against dogma or any belief based upon blind faith." Readers are advised to read her article "Is Theosophy a Religion?" (U.L.T. Pamphlet No. 1. Theosophy Co. [India] Private Ltd., Bombay) — Ed.

to Mesmer. She was an admirer of Paracelsus, the early sixteenth-century physician from whom Mesmer had learned so much. Madame Blavatsky rightly called Paracelsus "a pioneer of medical science," and she taught her followers to respect Mesmer, who "rediscovered and applied practically that magnetic fluid in man, which was called animal magnetism and since then Mesmerism." "All creatures," Madame Blavatsky wrote, "mankind, animals, and even every inanimate object emanates it [the magnetic fluid], either as an *aura* or a varying light, and that whether consciously or not."

Mrs. Eddy, on the other hand, who had been taught by a follower of one of Mesmer's disciples in direct succession of thought, did her best to discredit him. She insisted that her Christian Science was an entirely original conception, or divine revelation to herself. In fact she had what later generations call a complex about Mesmer. An entire chapter in her famous book *Science and Health* is called "Animal Magnetism Unmasked."

In England a religious interpretation of Mesmer's theories was slow to take root, but medical men were beginning to study them. The pioneer was Dr. John Elliotson, a highly respected professor at University College, London. He was a serious scholar, but unfortunately he combined a faith in clairvoyance and phrenology with his belief in Mesmer's theories. He operated on patients in the somnambulistic state, and this, too, was not popular with his colleagues who were just beginning to experiment with anaesthetics. Finally Dr. Elliotson was dismissed from University College and his periodical the *Zoist* had no great influence.

Despite Elliotson's failure to establish his ideas, medical science was growing increasingly conscious of Mesmer's importance. In Scotland, in the 1850's Dr. James Braid firmly discarded all the fantastic theories and practices of earlier mesmerizers and became the founder of modern medical hypnotism. In fact he invented the word. In France, in the 1860's and 80's, Dr. Ambrose-August Liébault and Dr. Hyppolite-Marie Bernheim developed a scientific technique for curative hypnotism. And though, of course, medical men even today may still argue about the application of hypnosis and cures by suggestion, they all acknowledge Mesmer's great contribution to medical science. It is interesting to recall in this connection the quotation from Horace which Mesmer chose as the motto for his doctor's thesis in 1765: "Much will rise again that has long been buried, and much become submerged that is held in honour today."

Multa renascentur, quae jam cecidere cadentque,
Quae nunc sunt in honore....

MARGARET GOLDSMITH

H. P. BLAVATSKY ON MESMERISM AND HYPNOTISM

The Theosophical viewpoint on the "abyss" between the two states can be seen from the following extracts:

...one is beneficent, the other maleficent, as it evidently must be; since, according to both Occultism and modern Psychology, *hypnotism is produced by the withdrawal of the nervous fluid from the capillary nerves,* which being, so to say, the sentries that keep the doors of our senses opened, getting *anaesthesized* under hypnotic conditions, allow these to get closed.

Hypnotism (U.L.T. Pamphlet No. 19), pp. 6-7.

It (hypnotism) differs from animal magnetism where the hypnotic condition is produced by the Braid method, which is a purely mechanical one, i.e., the fixing of the eyes on some bright spot, a metal or a crystal. It becomes "animal magnetism" (or mesmerism), when it is achieved by "mesmeric" passes on the patient, and for these reasons. When the first method is used, no electro-psychic, or even electro-physical currents are at work, but simply the mechanical, molecular vibrations of the metal or crystal gazed at by the subject. It is the *eye* — the most occult organ of all, on the superficies of our body — which, by serving as a medium between that bit of metal or crystal and the brain, *attunes* the molecular vibrations of the nervous centres of the latter into *unison* (i.e., equality in the number of their respective oscillations) with the vibrations of the bright object held. And, it is this unison which produces the hypnotic state. But in the second case, the right name for hypnotism would certainly be "animal magnetism" or that so much derided term "mesmerism." For, in the hypnotization by preliminary passes, it is the human will — whether conscious or otherwise — of the operator himself, that acts upon the nervous system of the patient. And it is again through the vibrations — only *atomic,* not *molecular* — produced by that act of energy called WILL in the ether of space (therefore, on quite a different plane) that the *super-hypnotic* state (i.e., "suggestion," etc.) is induced. For those which we call "will-vibrations" and their aura, are absolutely

distinct from the vibrations produced by the simply mechanical molecular motion, the two acting on two separate degrees of the cosmo-terrestrial planes.

. . . That which is transmitted has no name in European languages, and if we simply describe it as *will,* it loses all its meaning. . . . Occultism calls the force transmitted, the "auric fluid," . . . being a correlation of *atoms* on a higher plane, and a descent to this lower one, in the shape of impalpable and invisible plastic Substances, generated and directed by the potential Will. . . .

"Hypnotism and Its Relations to Other Modes of Fascination,"
Raja-Yoga or Occultism, pp. 188-9

When a healthy operator mesmerizes a patient with a determined desire to relieve and cure him, the exhaustion felt by the former is proportionate to the relief given: a process of *endosmose* has taken place, the healer having parted with a portion of his vital aura to benefit the sick man.

Ibid, p. 190

Hypnotic suggestion may cure for ever, and it may not. All depends on the degree of magnetic relations between the operator and the patient. *If* Karmic, they (diseases) will be only postponed, and return in some other form, not necessarily of disease, but as a punitive evil of another sort. . . .

Thought is more powerful than speech in cases of a real subjugation of the will of the patient to that of his operator. But, on the other hand, unless the "suggestion" made is for the good only of the subject, and entirely free from any selfish motive, a suggestion *by thought* is an act of *black magic* still more pregnant with evil consequences than a *spoken* suggestion. It is always wrong and unlawful to deprive a man of his free-will, *unless for his own or Society's good*; and even the former has to be done with great discrimination. Occultism regards all such promiscuous attempts as black magic and sorcery, whether conscious or otherwise.

Ibid, pp. 194-5

Thus experiments in "suggestion" by persons ignorant of the occult laws, are the most dangerous of pastimes. The action and reaction of ideas on the *inner lower* "Ego," has never been studied so far, because that Ego itself is *terra incognita* (even when not denied) to the men of science.

Hypnotism (U.L.T. Pamphlet No. 19), p. 14

BUDDHISM, AHIMSA, AND TOLERANCE

[The **Venerable Bhikkhu Khantipalo** writes lucidly of a subject on which his thought has especially dwelt. He has completed a book on *Tolerance: A Study from Buddhist Sources*, and the present article is actually an extract from his Introduction to that book. We welcome our friend to the pages of THE ARYAN PATH.—ED.]

IT SHOULD BE EVIDENT after some thousands of years' recorded history that from dogmatic assertions in religions, as in all other fields, proceeds the blight of intolerance, evilly fructifying in persecution. Of all the many forms of violence covered by the Indian term *himsā*, this is one of the most dread, and, sadly, one of the most evident both in the world's past and in the present-day situation. *Himsā* is always the outcome of dogmas violently supported but based upon no more than intellectual speculations and system-building, done in all religions where the desire is to strengthen still further the existing patterns of belief. Thus dogmas breed dogmas without end. Such are the majority of assertions made regarding Gods, Saviours, and Holy Books, and, together with the claims of the world's various priesthoods, these have produced innumerable wars and inconceivably great oceans of suffering.

What of the opposite tendency — *ahimsā*, the spirit of mildness, gentleness, and tolerance? From where is it derived? In India, *Jaina-dharma* has always been famous for its emphasis on non-violence. For the Jain, "*ahimsā parama dharma*" has always to be observed. It is natural that a doctrine striving not to harm or kill any being should be essentially pacific by nature. Where *ahimsā* is strong, tolerance must be likewise. This is one religion which has in scripture and practice promoted peaceable relations between men.

For the Buddhist, non-violence is not the highest teaching, but its place — an important one in *Buddha-dharma*, should be described. This principle may be regarded from three points of view. Ethically, it is a doctrine of non-offensiveness towards others, whereby their security (as well as one's own comfort) is upheld. Individual and social justice is quite impossible unless the ethics of non-harming are practised. The *Pañca-śīla* (Five Precepts) of the Buddhist layman are in fact all ways of training to eliminate violence both to oneself and all others. The ethical practice of *ahimsā* and its advantages are to be seen from the following:

> Intact is the strength of one who keeps his heart in obedience to

reason and strays not to ways of ill-will, aversion and hate. He hurts not himself, he hurts not others. He is a blessing to himself and to all else. He becomes beloved of all. His paths are made smooth. None envy him. Nobody is against him. Nobody grows jealous of him. He wings through life like a swan through the blue sky unhindered, an object of delight to all eyes.

Where such a loving one dwells, there all is at peace; for the loving one never interferes with others' rights, with others' freedom, with others' lives, in any way. He helps others in pleasant, kindly acts, endearing, encouraging, energizing and vitalizing all with his benign nature.[1]

Psychologically, *ahiṁsā* is practice in controlling and overcoming mental factors (*cetasikā*) such as anger, ill-will, and remorse. To the extent that these are overcome, the desire to destroy becomes less. Those who have completely cured the illness of anger and related diseases practise throughout their lives the virtue of harmlessness. That this may grow speedily, not only abstention from hatred is necessary but also its positive counterpart, the cultivation of the wholesome factors or *Maitrī* (altruistic loving-kindness), *Karuṇā* (willingness to share others' sorrows, compassion) and *Muditā* (sympathetic joy). A more detailed account of these negative and positive mental factors in relation to the growth of tolerance requires a long study which would here be out of place.

How is *ahiṁsā* to be viewed philosophically? In laying hold of the gem of *ahiṁsā* and so of toleration, we soon find that the whole jewel-net of the most profound and fundamental teachings of the Exalted One is moved and related. Each teaching may be briefly noted here for its connection to our subject. For exhaustive and systematic treatment of these doctrines, readers must turn to manuals specially devoted to their exposition.

The Buddhist upholds *ahiṁsā* as he neither wishes harm to himself nor to others. He thereby practises the Buddha's teaching that deliberate actions (of thought, speech, body) are potentially productive of result. This means that all *karmas* — volitional deeds — have inherently sufficient energy to come at some time to fruition. (Results, *vipāka*, however, are limited, since conditions may be unfavourable to their arising or, counter-active Karma may be strong enough to prevent the fruition of previous action.) Thus realizing:

I am responsible for my deed [*karma*], I am the heir to my deed, the

[1] *Dharmapradīpikā* of GURULUGOMI, IV (Buddhist Publication Society, Ceylon).

> womb of my deed, the Kinsman of my deed, I am he to whom my deed comes home. Whatever deed I shall do, be it good or bad, of that I shall be the heir[2]

he is careful not to commit what is wrong in the sense of harmful, only doing what is wholesome and beneficial. All this is based upon the Compassionate One's Words:

> All beings are afraid of pain, all beings are afraid of death. Recognizing (lit., comparing) oneself in others, one should neither kill nor cause to kill.[3]

In this way Buddhists understand that to practise *ahiṁsā* results in happiness arising for themselves and comfort for others, immediately, later in this life, or in a future state of birth.

A second doctrine deeply connected with *Karma* is that of "conditioned co-production" (the most accurate rendering of *Pratitya-Samutpāda*). This teaching states that all "things" — events, places, beings, everything from the cosmic formation of galaxies to the components of a single thought — arise owing to conditioning factors (*pratyāya*) of varying types and differing strengths. Thus, there are no events, beings, etc. arising from nothing. Nor is there anything arisen or produced from one cause. This teaching is not that of cause and effect but rather of complexes of conditioning forces operating on one another throughout past, present, and future, giving rise through this interaction to phenomena. Studying this teaching, one becomes aware that all phenomena, including of course what I call "myself," are dependently related, more or less remotely, to all other phenomenal events. To hurt others is thus to hurt oneself and to do injury to oneself is to harm all others; for here our idea of a separate personality, being, self, is seen to be false, and the artificial barriers between the "self" and the "other" are broken down. All men wish for their own happiness; a good man is glad both in his own happiness and in that of others; the wise man rejoices that through knowledge of interdependence he may be of benefit to all, acting without thought of self. Those who have realized what *Pratitya-Samutpāda* means through the growth of their wisdom are incapable of any violence, since they no longer distinguish between "I" and "not-I."

Fundamental to the *Dharma* as a path of progress is the balanced

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[2] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, "*Dasanipāta*," Ch. V, *Sutta* VIII.

[3] *Dhammapada*. Trs. by GOVINDA. Verse 129.

development of *Prajñā* and *Karuṇā* (Wisdom and Compassion). In outlining *ahiṁsā* from the Buddhist standpoint, both these factors have been related to it. *Ahiṁsā* as a quality is the expression of *Karuṇā*, whereas, going deeper into the doctrine, we find that *Prajñā* is necessary for initial understanding and grows as the mind is sharpened to penetrate the nature of *Saṁsāra*, the realm of birth and death, and of *Nirvāṇa*, the Undying.

BHIKKHU KHANTIPALO

IT WOULD SEEM that the amount of destructiveness to be found in individuals is proportionate to the amount to which expansiveness of life is curtailed. . . . Life has an inner dynamism of its own; it tends to grow, to be expressed, to be lived. It seems that if this tendency is thwarted the energy directed towards life undergoes a process of decomposition and changes into energies directed towards destruction. . . . The more the drive towards life is thwarted, the stronger is the drive towards destruction; the more life is realized, the less is the strength of destructiveness. *Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life.*

—ERICH FROMM

INDIAN BIRD MYTHS AND LEGENDS

[**Shri M. V. Sridatta Sarma, M.A.,** is in the personal service of H. H. the Maharaja of Mysore. He is interested in the reflection of feelings and ideas to be found in old Indian works. He collated some interesting references for us in "The Horse in Indian Lore" (THE ARYAN PATH, October 1962). This similar essay brings together many instances of the mythic and literary significance of birds in the Indian mind.—ED.]

WINGED CREATURES have a special bearing and significance in Indian mythology, art, and literature. Abundant references are available in the Vedas, the epics, and the *kāvyas* about these, and they are of great interest. The conception is that the bird which soars up high in the skies symbolizes the path of absolution or direct emancipation. It is a type of the yogi who attains direct realization (*aparokṣānubhūti*) by going up to the celestial regions, which represent Viṣṇu's most exalted position (*Tadviṣṇoḥ paramam padam*). In the *Varāha Upaniṣad,* mention is made of the two eternal paths of realization, viz., the direct (*sadyomukti*) and the progressive (*kramamukti*), which is attained by stages. The first of these, which was propounded by Śuka, is otherwise known as *vihanga-mārga* (the pathway of the bird), while the other, as followed by the sage Vāmadeva, is known as the *Pipīlikā-mārga* (the pathway of the ant). We see in Indian mythology that the various kinds of beings inhabiting the celestial zones are depicted as possessing wings. The *vimāna* or celestial vehicle used by the *Devas* is pictured as being provided with wings. Stories are abundant about lofty mountains which possessed wings and moved like mighty birds in the air. Indra is said to have clipped their wings. Maināka, a son of Himālaya, is said to have turned to the ocean as a hiding place, being stricken with panic at the onset of the Lord of the Devas.

Similarly, we hear of the celestial elephants which possessed wings and four tusks. These creatures were causing great havoc by alighting upon the dwellings of the sages and ravaging hermitages. It is said that a sage named Dīrghatapas, who was annoyed by the inroads of these winged beings, inflicted a curse on them. The result was that they were not only deprived of their wings and two additional tusks, but also dispossessed of the faculty of speech (*Cf.* Nīlakaṇṭha's *Matangalīlā*). Fleet horses like Indra's Uccaiśravas are also described as possessing wings.

The possession of wings and the faculty of flight in the aerial zones were considered a mark of prowess. The chieftain of the feathered race

was Garuḍa, the vehicle and ensign of Viṣṇu. By reason of his proximity to the godhead, Garuḍa was revered by all the three worlds. The *Garuḍa Upaniṣad* describes this mighty bird as endowed with wings, claws, and beak of steel. He is the type of Divine Energy among the winged creatures (*vainateyaśca pakṣiṇām*). The falcon thus served as a mark of splendour (*Cf.*, "*Śyeno gṛdhrāṇām*," in the *Ṛgveda*).

The Puranic stories relate a dispute between the two wives of Kāśyapa, Kadru and Vinatā, regarding the colour of the sun's horses. The former maintained that they were black, the latter, that they were white. Kadru, the mother of the reptiles, who was bent on winning, induced her children to defile the horses by spitting their venom over them. By this artifice she was able to win the wager, and in forfeit Vinatā was reduced to her slave. Vinatā's son Garuḍa displayed his might at the time of the churning of the ocean. Viṣṇu, pleased, conferred on him a boon in allowing the snakes to be devoured by him. Indra, the Lord of the Devas, directed this king of birds to take preventive measures against serpents consuming nectar. Garuḍa, who was elated by these encomiums, in his turn approached the members of the serpent race with the vessel containing the celestial elixir and obtained his mother's release from slavery, but kept the elixir inviolate by a stratagem. He placed the vessel on a bed of *kuśa* grass. As the serpents eagerly approached, Indra snatched away the vessel. The serpents licked the sharp grass blades and their tongues were divided. The term Garuḍa denotes one who swallows — the serpents. Garuḍa is invoked in charms to ward off the evil effects of serpent poison. He is the eradicator of poison "in the same manner as fire destroys a heap of cotton in no time." In warfare, *Garuḍāstra*, the *Garuḍa* missile, serves as a counter to the *Sarpa* missile. There is a peculiar mode of deploying an army in battle known as the *Garuḍa Vyūha*. Garuḍa is a manifestation of the Supreme Spirit. Says the *Garuḍa Gāyatrī*: "May we know that Divine Person. For that, may we meditate on *suvarna pakṣa*. May Garuḍa impel us towards it."

In iconographic descriptions, Garuḍa is represented as possessing a human face with aquiline nose. To him the serpent Ananta serves as a bracelet; Vāsuki, as a sacred-thread (*yajñopavīta*); and Kārkoṭaka, as a garland. The eagle sacred to Viṣṇu is "of red colour, with its white face shining like the moon" (*kumkumānkita sarvāngam kundendudhavalānanam*).

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* descriptions of the vulture species occur. Thus we hear of the vulture Jaṭāyu, the son of Śyenā and Garuḍa. This mighty

bird was the saviour of Daśaratha's life on one occasion, when he was overthrown together with his car by Saturn, against whom he had proceeded. Jaṭāyu fought desperately against Rāvaṇa when he carried away Sītā. He was mortally wounded and lay so till Rāma found him in the course of his search for Sītā. Having informed Rāma of Sītā's plight he breathed his last. Lakṣmaṇa performed his obsequies. Sampāti, a fabulous bird of gigantic size, was the brother of Jaṭāyu. He gave directions to the monkey chieftains, who went on in quest of Sītā.

In Kṣemendra's *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī,* there is mention of a bird of monstrous size like the Garuḍa, which carried away a princess of Kośāmbi, by name Mṛgavati. Birds of this species, it is said, were as strong as five elephants. The two-headed eagle Gaṇḍabheruṇḍa is depicted as holding an elephant in each of its claws and beaks.

A story in the *Mahābhārata* narrates that with a view to testing Śibi, Indra assumed the form of a hawk, while Agni appeared in the shape of a dove, the latter being pursued by the former. Śibi offered his own flesh and weighed it out in a balance in ransom for the dove's life.

Poetic descriptions of the Supreme Spirit in Vedic texts are given in terms of the "beautiful-winged" bird (*Suparṇa*): "The Beautiful-winged, though He is one, the wise poets shape with songs in many figures" (*Ṛgveda*). In another famous passage of the *Ṛgveda,* the individual and the Supreme Spirit are referred to as two birds sitting on the self-same tree. While the one tastes the sweet berry (*pippala*), the other simply looks on at everything (*Ṛgveda*, I. 164. 20).

The beautiful-winged swan (*haṁsa*) becomes the favourite of Vedic poets and seers. Sanskrit poets describe it as the vehicle of Brahmā. This bird is ever ready to make its flight towards the Mānasa Lake at the approach of the rains. So Kālidāsa's Yakṣa tells the Cloud: "The swans in their eagerness for the lake Mānasa furnished with bits of lotus stalk for food on the journey will be your associates in the sky as far as Mount Kailāsa (*Meghadūta,* 11). The *haṁsa* symbolizes the Ultimate Being. The sun is described as seated "like the swan in the midst of light" (*Ṛgveda,* IV. 45). The *haṁsa* is the soul or *Jīvātman.* An ascetic or spiritual preceptor is known as *Haṁsa* or *Paramahaṁsa.*

According to poetical convention the swan is gifted with the peculiar faculty of separating milk from water. Also its peculiar gait or graceful movement is admiringly described (*haṁsagati, haṁsagāminī*).

In the Nala episode, a celestial swan which was captured by Damayantī offers to play the role of an ambassador of love to bring about the

marriage with Nala. The bird speaks in polished accents. During Nala's wanderings, two swans (the dice in that form) appear before him. On an attempt at catching them for food, they snatch away his garment.

The parrot or *śuka* is also a favourite bird in Hindu mythology. It symbolizes the soul. Devi is fond of the *śuka*. She sports with a parrot. Sometimes the parrot is represented as being placed in a cage. The import is that the frame or cage represents the body. The bird inside is indicative of the soul (*Omkārapañjaraśukīm*). As the vehicle of Cupid, *śuka* serves as the emblem of love. In Bāna's *Kādambarī*, there is a description of the hermitage of Agastya near the Vindhya forests. The groves there echo with the lessons imparted to the inmates. The parrots by constant hearing learn their lessons and repeat them. We hear of the parrot Vaiśaṁpāyana singing in the *Āryā* metre. In *Śukasaptati*, a parrot narrates seventy stories to a married woman, while her husband is away travelling. The sage Śuka, the most rigid observer of continence, is represented in paintings and also in images as possessing the head of a parrot. The parrot and the *sārikā*, by the fault of their tongues, get themselves bound, says a *subhāṣita* (*Ātmano mukhadoṣena badhyante śukasārikāḥ*).

The *cakravāka* or the ruddy goose is an example of a love-bird. In the marriage hymn of the *Ṛgveda*, there is a passing reference to this bird, which always remains with its mate. Indra is invoked to see that there is such conjugal felicity for the bride and bridegroom as for the *cakravāka* pair. In the *Meghadūta*, the Yakṣa tells the Cloud about his beloved thus: "Thou mayest know her, who is taciturn in the absence of me, her companion, solitary like a *cakravākī*, to be my second life." In the *Harivaṁśa*, it is said that the ruddy geese move about in Śaradvīpa; the swans sport in the Mānasa Lake.

The peacock or *mayūra* is spoken of as being the vehicle of the war-god Skanda. It was of service to the gods in the war to suppress the lawlessness of the great fiend Tāraka. According to *Gaṇeśa Purāṇa*, Gaṇeśa had the peacock for his vehicle in the *Tretā Yuga* and he is therefore styled *Mayūreśa*. Devī is sometimes described as "a pea-hen sporting in the garden of mystical knowledge." The wild cock (*kukkuṭa*) serves as the standard of Skanda.

The franklin partridge (*tittiri*) is referred to in connection with the *Taittirīya* (or black) *Yajurveda*. Thus, Vaiśaṁpāyana, who was a prominent disciple of the sage Vyāsa, did not attend a council of sages at Mount Meru. So he incurred the sin of Brahmanicide. With a view to

absolve himself of this sin, he called upon his twenty-seven disciples to perform the necessary rites. His maternal nephew Yājñavalkya volunteered to do everything alone. He spoke slightingly of the co-disciples, so much so that Vaiśaṁpāyana was offended. For this effrontery, he bade him to give up the Veda committed to him. Yājñavalkya's protest that he was acting only out of his attachment to his *Guru* was of no avail. The *Guru* was not satisfied. The Veda was disgorged in a tangible form sustained with blood by Yājñavalkya. At the instance of Vaiśaṁpāyana, the other disciples temporarily assumed the form of *tittiri* birds and picked up the leavings. The epithet *Taittirīya* was thus assigned to the Veda by virtue of its connection with the *tittiri* birds. This bird is also known as *cātaka,* suposed to live only on raindrops.

In *Āswalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra,* the use of the flesh of the *tittiri* bird is enjoined during *Annaprāśana* (ceremony of giving an infant solid food for the first time) for one who aspires to *Brahma-varcas* (spiritual pre-eminence or holiness resulting from sacred knowledge).

The legend of the *ṭiṭṭibha* is taken as an example of one who practises restraint of the *manas* with a cheerful heart. A *ṭiṭṭibha* couple lived on the seashore, pounded by the surf. The male bird was puffed up with pride. It left the eggs in spite of the wife's remonstrances. The wife was offered the consolation that if the ocean washed away the newly laid eggs, the husband would render the ocean powerless. The ocean, on the other hand, having heard of the conversation, carried off the eggs with big waves. After some time, the *ṭiṭṭibha* couple returned, only to find the eggs missing. The male bird was determined to dry up the ocean, as the protests made by him were of no avail. The ocean mocked at the birds. The male bird then approached the king of the feathered race, Garuḍa, for help. Millions of the bird race flocked together at the spot and evinced friendship by co-operating with the couple. They worked both day and night taking out the waters. Sage Nārada dissuaded the birds from this resolve, which seemed to him to be fickle. The mighty Garuḍa supported the cause and, in the end, the ocean trembled with fear and restored the eggs to their parents. This story is narrated with reference to a *śloka* appearing in the *Gauḍapādakārikā* (*śloka* 41): "Like the emptying of the ocean with the tip of a blade of *Kuśa* grass, drop by drop, so has the restraint of manas to be achieved with weariness."

M. V. Sridatta Sarma

THE POETRY OF WILLIAM COWPER

[**Mr. Herbert Bluen,** poet, writer, and lecturer, has contributed often to our pages. Readers will remember his articles on James Elroy Flecker (March 1960) and Christina Rossetti (February 1963). In this article Mr. Bluen again writes with insight and sympathy of another poet and his work.—Ed.]

The poetry of William Cowper has much in common with that of his contemporary, William Wordsworth. Both found in nature an unfailing source of inspiration and were essentially humble men with a faith in a divine Power. Wordsworth is the greater poet because of his deeper insight and superior command of language; nevertheless, Cowper's long blank-verse poem entitled "The Task," from which I quote six passages, contains some superb descriptions of natural scenery and is a notable contribution to the literature of eighteenth-century England. Cowper differs radically from his other contemporary, Alexander Pope, not only in poetic technique but also in his philosophy of life. Cowper is essentially a poet of the country; Pope is essentially a poet of the town. Pope loves the bustle and sophistication of urban life, but Cowper believes that true contentment is only to be found amid the beauties of nature:

> The air salubrious of her lofty hills,
> The cheering fragrance of her dewy vales,
> And music of her woods—no work of man
> May rival these; these all bespeak a power
> Peculiar, and exclusively her own.

Cowper was born on 15 November 1731. His father, John Cowper, was rector of Berkhampstead, Hertfordshire, and his mother was related to the poet Donne. On leaving Westminster School, where he possibly spent one of the happier periods of his life, it was intended that he should follow a legal career, but although he was called to the Bar in 1754 he never practised. He became attracted to his cousin, Theodora, who like himself already showed signs of nervous instability and his uncle forbade the marriage. This was a severe blow to the lovers and Theodora spent the rest of her life in an eccentric spinsterhood. Poor Cowper was fated to suffer from attacks of melancholia and during 1763-5 he was in an asylum. After a temporary cure he settled in Huntingdon with a clergyman named Unwin, his wife Mary, and their son and daughter. Not long afterwards the Reverend Unwin was killed in an

accident. Cowper however continued to live with the family and was thereafter seldom separated from the devoted Mrs. Unwin. It was indeed on Mrs. Unwin's suggestion that Cowper turned to writing poetry when he was already fifty, and doubtless Mrs. Unwin believed that his literary efforts would have a therapeutic value. Cowper certainly enjoyed his new occupation; for he penned the well-known words:

> There is a pleasure in poetic pains
> Which only poets know.

Religion had now become the dominant factor of his life and the first verses he wrote after his recovery were hymns. They have the spontaneity of his letters and some of them such as "Walking With God" and "Light Shining Out of Darkness" are justly famous. His needs and his pleasures were simple and from his rustic seclusion he grieves for those with more worldly dispositions:

> I see that all are wanderers, gone astray
> Each in his own delusions; they are lost
> In chase of fancied happiness, still wooed
> And never won.

Cowper's mind is not of the scientific or enquiring kind. Belief in God suffices him and he regards as futile the efforts of scientists and philosophers to unravel the mysteries of the universe:

> "Defend me therefore, common sense," say I,
> "From reveries so airy, from the toil
> Of dropping buckets into empty wells,
> And growing old in drawing nothing up!"

These lines, incidentally, illustrate Cowper's gifts for expressing himself with persuasive wit; but his tendency to moralize sometimes becomes irritating and there are passages in his poetry which sound ominously like metrical sermons. His sincerity, however, is never in question and there is never any deliberate attempt to dazzle or win the reader's admiration. With Pope on the other hand we feel that the poet is well aware of his brilliance and is endeavouring to make his public aware of it also.

One of Cowper's assets is his keen eye for small details. He is like a fine water-colourist who paints on a small canvas and reveals hidden beauty. His charming description of a greenhouse is a good example of his uncanny aptitude for "painting" with words:

The spiry myrtle with unwithering leaf
Shines there and flourishes. The golden boast
Of Portugal and Western India there,
The ruddier orange and the paler lime,
Peep through their polished foliage at the storm
And seem to smile at what they need not fear.

Cowper takes an almost sensuous delight in those small domestic comforts which are so easily taken for granted simply because they have grown familiar. For him the daily round is seldom tedious and when the sun sets he anticipates with intense pleasure the friendly gathering by the hearth:

Now stir the fire, and close the shutters fast,
Let fall the curtains, wheel the sofa round,
And while the bubbling and loud hissing urn
Throws up a steamy column, and the cups
That cheer but not inebriate, wait on each,
So let us welcome peaceful evening in.

Many poets have sung the praises of spring, summer, and autumn but when they mention winter it is often merely as a harbinger of spring, not for its intrinsic beauty. Cowper loves winter for its own sake. To him it is not a disagreeable season that we are obliged to tolerate but a magician who transforms the earth into a fairyland of silver and rules over it like a king:

A leafless branch thy sceptre, and thy throne
A sliding car, indebted to no wheels,
But urged by storms along its slippery way;
I love thee, all unlovely as thou seemest,
And dreaded as thou art.

Besides "The Task," which is his principal achievement, Cowper wrote several other long poems. "Conversation," from which I quote three passages, is the best of these and is often delightfully witty. Cowper undoubtedly enjoys good conversation but his shy nature shrinks from argument:

Ye powers who rule the tongue, if such there are,
And make colloquial happiness your care,
Preserve me from the thing I dread and hate,
A duel in the form of a debate.

Many people, like Cowper, have encountered the exasperating person who loves contradiction for its own sake:

Set your opinion at whatever pitch,
Knots and impediments make something hitch;
Adopt his own, 'tis equally in vain,
Your thread of argument is snapped again;
The wrangler, rather than accord with you,
Will judge himself deceived,—and prove it too.

With his close friends Cowper was no doubt entirely at ease and, if we are to judge from his letters, a charming and witty companion. But in the company of those outside his intimate circle he was probably much less happy and can sympathize with those who like himself suffer the embarrassment caused by shyness:

Our sensibilities are so acute,
The fear of being silent makes us mute.

Some of Cowper's shorter poems such as "On the Loss of the Royal George" are deservedly well known. Others, such as his Epitaph for his pet hare, Tiney, show a love and compassion for dumb animals and have a wistful beauty. "The Nightingale and Glow-Worm" is a charming little fable in which a hungry nightingale seizes a glow-worm one evening intending to eat it for supper, but the glow-worm pleads eloquently for its life, arguing that the same divine Power taught the nightingale to sing and the glow-worm to shine so that both might add enchantment to the night. The nightingale is so moved by the pleas of his intended victim that he releases it and flies away to seek his supper elsewhere. The fable concludes with the sensible suggestion that men should likewise learn to live together peacefully,

Respecting in each other's case,
The gifts of nature and of grace.

"The Diverting History of John Gilpin" is one of Cowper's most popular poems. It is the story, told with gusto, of a linen-draper who on his wife's suggestion agrees to celebrate their wedding anniversary by taking his family and other relatives for a trip to Edmonton. A friend lends Gilpin a horse for the journey and it is arranged that the rest of the party should travel in a chaise and pair. There are various unexpected complications, however, and the friend's horse, with Gilpin precariously in the saddle, gallops away at such a pace that witnesses of the astonishing spectacle imagine the worst:

"Stop thief! stop thief!—a highwayman!"
Not one of them was mute;

> And all and each that passed that way
> Did join in the pursuit.

In "On the Receipt of My Mother's Picture out of Norfolk" Cowper describes how on contemplating the picture of his dead mother bitter-sweet memories of his vanished childhood and her tender love for him return. The poem is all the more deeply moving for the simplicity with which it is written:

> Oh that those lips had language! Life has passed
> With me but roughly since I heard thee last.
> These lips are thine—thy own sweet smile I see,
> The same that oft in childhood solaced me. . . .

Towards the end of his life Cowper translated Homer's *Odyssey* and received a royal pension in recognition of his merits as a poet. He died on 25 April 1800.

Some of Cowper's poetry has "dated," it is true, but the best of it will be remembered as long as there are those who find delight in the inspired work of a gentle and devout mind.

HERBERT BLUEN

As those who withstand thy progress along the path of right reason will never be able to turn thee aside from sound action, so let them not wrest thee from a kindly attitude towards them; but keep a watch over thyself in both directions alike, not only in steadfastness of judgment and action but also in gentleness towards those who endeavour to stand in thy path or be in some other way a thorn in thy side. For in fact it is a sign of weakness to be angry with them, no less than to shrink from action and be terrified into surrender. For they that do the one or the other are alike deserters of their post, the one as a coward, the other as estranged from a natural kinsman and friend.

—MARCUS AURELIUS

BHARATI'S "KUYIL PATTU"

AN APPRECIATION

[**Dr. Prema Nandakumar** is devoted equally to literature in English and in Sanskrit and Tamil. By the side of a continuous stream of critical writing, she has essayed also a translation of some poems by the great Tamil poet of the last generation, Subrahmanya Bharati. This "appreciation" is full of a warm feeling.—Ed.]

Kuyil Pattu ("Kuyil's Song") is a narrative poem in nine parts, totalling 750 lines. It may be called a fable, because the principal character is a *kuyil* (the Indian nightingale), and two of the other characters are a monkey and a bull. It may be called a dream-sequence, for some of the events partake of the tantalizing quality of dreams. In fact we are told at the very beginning:

> As in the ecstasy of
> poesy Reality fades
> And in the giddiness of a
> hot day the poet partakes
> Of day-dream visions—I saw.

A fable and a dream-poem, it is also a sort of vision seen or imagined by the poet. Like Keats in his *Ode to a Nightingale,* Bharati is both transfigured and exhausted by his extraordinary experience.

Kuyil Pattu is unquestionably the most audacious, the most original, and the most enjoyable of the creations of Bharati's poetic imagination. Professor P. Mahadevan enthusiastically describes it as "the purest and most gorgeous efflorescence of Bharati's poetic genius." A dream-vision in simple, dissolving Tamil, *Kuyil Pattu* has not the emotional versatility and spiritual fervour of *Kannan Pattu* or the epic sweep and passionate intensity of *Panchali Sapatham*. While writing *Kannan Pattu,* Bharati was lost in the mysticism of *bhakti rasa*. *Panchali Sapatham* was shot through and through with *veera rasa,* the heroine Draupadi standing in the lonely lighthouse grandeur of her strength of will and her sublime faith. On the other hand, *Kuyil Pattu* is saturated with *hasya rasa* or scintillating humour. Although all the nine *rasas* ultimately hark back to the same source that is Life, and Bharati himself was able to handle any type of emotion, exploit any *rasa,* still, as a sheer projection of the poet's riotous fancy and vivid imagination, *Kuyil Pattu* is without a rival in the Bharati canon — perhaps in all Tamil literature.

This is the story. One morning the poet finds himself in a luxuriant garden in Pondicherry. There are no birds and no bird-catchers, but one solitary *kuyil,* perched on a branch, is singing a full-throated song. Although in no recognizable language, the poet discovers in the *ku-ku-ku* of the song both words and rhythm, the cadence of music and whole spirals of meaning. The *ku-ku-ku* becomes in the song a threefold repetition of one word after another, while the middle line purposively links the contrasted key-words — love-death, joy-misery, harmony-discord, fame-shame, etc. — and it is out of these antinomies that the *kuyil* fashions her music. The last two stanzas are:

Oh, bliss of lover's union:
But when the partner leaves,
Only pine for ever.
Oh, rich melodious flute:
But when it cracks,
Alas, cast it away.

The key-note is the hunger for love; failing love, the inevitability of death. When the song ends, the poet approaches the bird and asks why she is pouring forth her heart in such sweet-sad ecstasy. "I seek love — or, death," the *kuyil* says, and entreats the poet to return on the fourth day. During the next two days the poet is drawn to the garden, and sees the *kuyil* flirting with a monkey one day and with a bull on the next day. On both occasions the poet makes a dash for the intruding lover (monkey or bull), but both disappear eluding his wrath. On the fourth day the poet goes to the garden to be revenged on the wanton *kuyil,* but the very sight of her softens him and the *kuyil* asks him not to judge her in haste. She recites her star-crossed life in a previous birth. She had been a girl, Kuyili by name, in love with her cousin Madan, but her parents had decided that she should marry Kurangan. On the eve of the marriage, she met a prince in the woods and lost her heart to him, but Madan and Kurangan surprised them and all the three rivals to her love died in the struggle. The four actors in that tragic drama are now reborn as the bird, the bull, the monkey, and the poet. So that 's it! The poet tries to seize the *kuyil* in mad rapture to kiss her — and, lo and behold, she turns a woman again, flawless in her beauty:

A wonder passing
    strange! Oh, miracle!
Nectar from the
    sea of love! A realm

Of light and glimpse of
heavenly Womanhood!
A maid stood there
with radiant delight
And eyes cast down; she
looked at me and bowed.
Lord, to limn her beauties
in homely speech!
The man-devouring
wonder of her eyes!
To seize the poetry
that swam in her gaze . . .
This is all I can say
to the learned and wise:
Mixing the justice of poesy
and the essence of verse,
Seasoning with nectar and
congealing with love,—
Even so Brahma
fashioned this angel.

But the rapture fades of a sudden, the poet wakes up with a start, and he sees only the battered mat, the crumpled papers, and the other usual concomitants of his unkempt study room!

We could no doubt dismiss it all as a fantasy, a tale suffused with humour and fancy to while away an idle hour. But Bharati himself throws out a challenge at the end:

Howbeit a fictional tale,
O wise old poets,
Could my story yield
on closer study
A deep philosophical meaning,
Won't you explain
what it is indeed?

One critic has tried to explain the tale in terms of the Shaiva concept of *pati-pasu-pasam* — the Lord (the poet), the soul (the *kuyil*), and the illusions separating them (the monkey, the bull). Another equates the *kuyil* with love itself: "Love is immortal so long as it holds no commerce with life, but when it limits itself by wedding life, joy must turn to sorrow." It is possible again to see some similarity between the *kuyil*'s story and the Western tale of the Beauty and the Beast. As in the latter

story (but with the roles reversed), when the poet accepts the *kuyil*'s love at last, the *kuyil* ceases to be a bird, the spell is lifted, and she becomes a beautiful girl again.

However, it is more enchanting and challenging to draw nearer the poem itself and look for the main clue in the title song which begins:

> Love, oh, love without end:
> And love failing,
> Death, but death for ever.

At first we do not know the truth about the *kuyil*'s identity. Only its voice is real. The silence in the wood, the loneliness of the surroundings, the poet rapt in the solitary voice, all recall Shelley's

> A widow bird sate mourning for love
> Upon a wintry bough.

The poet only *feels,* again very much like the Shelley who wrote:

> And still I felt the centre of
> The magic circle there
> Was one fair form that filled with love
> The lifeless atmosphere.

It is at the *end* of the poem that the poet is able to *see* the beautiful woman hid in the dark bird. Beauty is released from its prison then; and so we may say indeed that the *kuyil* symbolizes Beauty. And Beauty for its full blossoming must ever hunger for love. Unless true love gathers beauty and weds it, this beauty would have been in vain. Love has to redeem beauty wherever it may be — and beauty is everywhere. Bharati's philosophy was simply Love — the Universal Elixir for the hungering and self-tortured mind. Bharati's career began when India started her struggle for freedom in real earnest. Swami Vivekananda's words were not lost upon Bharati:

> Feel from the heart. What is in the intellect or reason? It goes a few steps and there it stops. But through the heart comes inspiration. Love opens the most impossible gates; love is the gate to all the secrets of the universe.

With this *mantra* of love Bharati ascended higher and higher yet till he could love even the hidden things of the phenomenal world, till he could reach into the hidden heart of hearts and see there *satyam, śivam, sundaram* (the true, the good, the beautiful). Viewed against the background of Bharati's other writings, *Kuyil Pattu* is verily a Hymn of Love, celebrating its utter unpredictability, its glorious illogicality, and

its defiant deathlessness.

The sheer melodic richness and tantalizing quality of the *Kuyil Pattu* has naturally won great praise and the song has enjoyed universal currency. Deeply moved by even a translation of ten short verses, Professor August Closs wrote in the course of a letter: "It is so simple and at the same time deep." The Professor also saw the whole point and purpose of the poem as a shower of irreconcilables that yet somehow reconciles everything. The song creates a vague longing, a singular disturbance somewhere — we know not where. Perhaps it is the one song that shows remarkable affinity in content and movement to Shelley's "The Flight of Love," which begins with the enumeration of a series of love's setbacks:

When the lamp is shattered,
The light in the dust lies dead—
When the cloud is scattered,
The rainbow's glory is shed.
When the lute is broken,
Sweet tones are remembered not;
When the lips have spoken,
Loved accents are soon forgot.

We should not be very much off the track if we said that the original inspiration behind *Kuyil Pattu* was this poem of Shelley's. If somebody were to discover a "Road to the Kuyil's Song" (as Professor J. L. Lowes has found a long, long road to Coleridge's *Kubla Khan*), he might have to journey from this Shelleyan starting-point. This was how it probably happened. Bharati was reading "The Flight of Love" one morning. Then, as the day was shading towards the afternoon, he went to his friend's mango-grove in Muthyalpet. After some conversation he began humming a tune or two, felt drowsy, and lay beneath a tree while his unconscious self vaguely recorded the *ku-ku-ku* of a *kuyil,* as from far away. Bharati must have subsided into the interesting stage between wakefulness and sleep, and there remained for a full creative period. When he woke up, he had already composed mentally *Kuyil Pattu* — which is Bharati's *Kubla Khan,* but a complete poem and no mere fragment. At any rate, we are the richer, and the world is the richer, for Bharati's *Kuyil Pattu,* which is one of the greatest of modern love poems, and a poem that in its form and articulation is truly *sui generis.*

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

MEDICINE NEEDS A PHILOSOPHY *

THE UNDERLYING SIGNIFICANCE of the book, more than its title, makes it admirable and inspiring. Neither the word "Gods" nor the word "ancient" gives the true indication of the moral that this book brings to the door of the reading and thinking public. The message of the book is that modern physiology needs a philosophy to fulfil itself and the modern pharmacopoeia of medicines needs a spiritual integration to make it the true healing agent and not mere objective therapeutics which will fail to see the wood for the trees. A modern medical authority of eminence (Dr. Jayne was Emeritus Professor at the University of Colorado) turns to the healing Gods of ancient civilizations to remind the modern medical profession of this forgotten message.

The sulphas, antibiotics, and tranquillizing meprobromates have created a revolution in current medical practice. The modern medical world, in spite of many brilliant discoveries of wonder drugs and wonderful cures, is full of strange paradoxes. While we destroy and control disease after disease, we seem to be progressively losing health in the real sense of the term. Diseases continue to multiply, besetting the heart, the circulation, the digestion, the kidney, and the nerves. If we have destroyed malaria, we have developed tuberculosis; and if we have cured tuberculosis, we have developed cancer. If we have cured pain in many respects, we have created new pains and suffering whose cure we do not know. Our hospitals cannot keep pace with the patients, and our mentally ill, in spite of tranquillizers, are growing in number.

The learned author truly says that in the economics of modern healing, time is of the essence and less time is required to prescribe a medicine than to understand a personality relationship. We have no time to study the real constitution of man. We have less time to be patient with a patient. We have no time for eating. We have no time for resting. We have no time for our health. We have no time for our diseases. We have still less time for medicines. We have no time to isolate causes and then correlate them to the whole which in essence real health is. We apply multipurpose medicine so that if one potency of it does not cure, we hope one of its other potencies will by some miracle hit the disease. The recent experience with a drug to relieve pregnancy discomforts shows that in our anxiety to relieve the mother of the natural pain of delivery we have created the more endless pain of accepting incurable deformities.

We are in the grip of a mechanistic physiology and still more mechanistic pharmacopoeia, in which the body is treated only as one more model of one more machine. A system of healing or therapeutics which is growing up without regard to the whole man and to the spiritual, emotional, and mental processes is bound to be unequal to the great and noble task of healing. The purely physical theories of disease can never lead to true healing, which not only derivatively but essentially means making whole. To heal is to make whole. The modern attempt to explain every spiritual aspiration, every feeling, every emotion, and every inspiration in terms of nerves or the physics and chemistry of glandular secretion is

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* *The Healing Gods of Ancient Civilizations.* By WALTER ADDISON JAYNE. (University Books, New Hyde Park, New York. 569 pp. 1962. $10.00)

based on a mechanistic view which has blinded so long our wonderful medical science.

The learned author deals with the healing Gods of ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Iran, Greece, Rome, the Pagan Semites of the West, and the Celts. He follows a well-set pattern. Of each country of ancient civilization he first makes a broad general survey, and discusses its healing deities. The general survey gives a good background to the understanding of the subject. In these countries, in ancient times, the healing art reached the highest standards. They show the wisdom of ages built on vast experience and, what is remarkable, the most accurate and scientific observation of man, nature, and the universe. No facts of life were outside their observation and scrutiny. Medical wisdom was not merely physiological, and medical knowledge but represented the total wisdom of man. Habits, food, drink, ritual magic, animals, plants and herbs, all played their part in providing effective cures and medicines in ancient civilization. Ancient pharmacopoeia knew the abundant use of organic and inorganic products. Communication with the spirit after death was also invoked in diagnosing and prescribing with considerable effect and acceptance. Medicine was part of the religion of man and was much nearer divinity than it is today. The priest therefore was ordinarily the medicine-man.

It is surprising to see how these ancient civilizations developed even surgery, and knew the healing of fractured bones. The tribute which Herodotus paid, and which the author quotes, shows for instance the high development of medicine and surgery in ancient Egypt. The learned author's discussion of India's contribution is highly informative. In dealing with the healing Gods of India the references are made to different diseases, their origin and treatment, and to the rites of sacrifice to induce the healing Gods to protect the body and its several parts, to cure sickness, and to bestow health and long life. Abundant references are collected from the Vedic literature. Of particular interest is his reference to several diseases, e.g., *Yakṣmā* (Phthisis), *hṛdyota* (heart disease) and *hariman* (jaundice), *kilasa* (leprosy), *arman* (disease of the eye), etc. The author quotes the *Ṛgveda,* the *Yajurveda,* and the *Atharvaveda.* The use of *mantras* (charged words) in curing diseases reached a high stage of development in India. The magnificent *Ayurveda* of ancient India reads today like the most modern book on physiology, surgery, and medicine. Apart from discussing the different Vedic Gods connected with health and the cure of diseases, the author draws the attention of the modern age to the herbal medicines used in ancient India and mentions the Indian plant *Sarpagandha,* now known as *Rauwolfia Serpentina,* which acts as a wonderful medicine in the modern pharmacopoeia. The wealth of detail collected and presented in this book makes it a truly impressive panorama of many ancient civilizations, showing their great contributions to the cause of healing. It is almost a modest encyclopaedia.

The one great lesson that this book draws from the pages of the history of ancient civilizations is that almost all tried to understand man as a whole and as a part of the universe. The older medical sciences and the therapeutics based upon them never lost this total vision. Naturally they understood the human constitution better. They treated it with sympathy. They allowed the forces of nature, both animate and inanimate, to be utilized in keeping the man whole and healthy and in curing diseases. Living close to nature was part of ancient therapeutics. Modern physiology and medical science are faced with the problem of artificial life in the present age, with artificial habits

and artificial diets. The one rule of physiology is that every step man takes away from nature leads to some disease or other. Every step in tune with nature brings him health. It is necessary to emphasize in this age of confusion that natural food is better than artificial or synthetic or chemical foods. If modern healing can recapture this vision and total technique, it will rescue itself from the crippling effect of sterility and narrow over-specialization. That is the bold message of this book.

P. B. MUKHARJI

ETHICS IN DISARRAY *

ETHICS, like metaphysics, is today in a state of disarray. In both cases two causes have been at work. First, the growing estrangement of theory from practice; the idea that in each we are playing a sort of game, only not for amusement but as a sort of full-time occupation. The other is the "linguistic" approach, which is responsible for creating a condition wherein the practitioners do not know what exactly they are about, much less whither they are going. The merely logical attempts to define concepts and to render more exact the terms employed in discourse of either sort have created this stalemate. Long ago Prichard in his "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" pointed to the vague dissatisfaction which has been manifested by most ethical writers about what this whole business is about. This author had asked, "What are books in Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" There is therefore just a flutter in philosophical dovecotes indicating an uneasiness about the present and a desire for a new "take-off." And, for this, to know what has been happening so far is a necessary prerequisite. The appearance of these two companion volumes is hence most welcome.

It is worth while to ask the question, How did the substantive concern of the earlier moralists change into the moral semantics of later thinkers of the kind of Stevenson or Hare? The figure of Moore is undoubtedly pivotal and there are those who rue his influence as a "disaster" (e.g., *vide Mind*, 278, p. 203) as much as others do "the highly syncopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein's flute."

The first book is concerned with one of the most important periods in the history of ethics from Hobbes to Kant, during which were manifested not merely "the main line of opposition" consisting in the antithesis between reason and passion but also the more transitory and less recurrent positions represented by the moral-sense writers (Hutcheson), the school of "sympathy" represented by Adam Smith, and many others.

I wish the author had provided a longer introduction to facilitate an average reader's seeing the different strands that have gone to make the fabric of moral theory instead of merely mentioning in the Preface the difference between the Naturalists, Theists, etc. The summaries of views are full and fair, and well supported by apt quotations, but they only inflame the desire for a more analytic approach, all the more necessitated by the author's concern with ethics rather than with history. One of the glaring exceptions to the general treatment meted out to the

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* *Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant.* By WILLIAM CURTIS SWABEY (284 pp.); *Contemporary Ethical Theories.* LUTHER BINKLEY (203 pp.). (Both Philosophical Library, New York. 1961. $4.75 each)

thinkers, however, is the chapter on Spinoza. I have often felt that his views have not yet been assessed at their proper value, but Dr. Swabey is less than just to him when he makes no mention of the basic metaphysics of which his ethics is only an aspect, nor refers even incidentally to the very fruitful conceptions of "the intellectual love of God" or "blessedness," and that makes the account seem critical and yet superficial.

The other book does not take up the thread where the first has left off, and one gets a feeling that there exists a hiatus which the publishers might have avoided. For the development of the contemporary analytic and linguistic approach cannot be duly appreciated (and I do not mean this in a merely historical sense) without referring to those intervening luminaries, such as Mill, and, more importantly, Hegel, Green, Caird, Bosanquet, and others of that line, leading on to the great work of Sidgwick. To understand the "commonsensical" attitude of Moore we must view it as an antithesis to the thesis presented by the "Idealists," from which derive the contemporary postures and predilections.

This of course is no fault of Professor Binkley, who shows a very thorough grasp of the subject he has dealt with, first analysing the different views of the Intuitionists, Emotivists, and the Linguistic philosophers, then offering a critical evaluation of each author, and in the final chapter attempting a neat tying-up of the various threads with a critical evaluation of them. Each point of view receives a treatment at once lucid and well-aimed, and the general impression is one of fairness born of understanding. I particularly like the author's effort at showing that there are important similarities between philosophy as practised earlier by Plato and Spinoza and later as practised by Ryle and Wittgenstein, and that linguistic analysis may not be the whole edifice of philosophy, but is at least its foundation. Unfortunately the modern moral philosophers themselves have sought to repel this view by insisting that their philosophy is a game — an end in itself. No wonder they are accused of having sold their "truthright for a mess of verbiage."

In his anxiety to bring some significance out of the welter of modern views, the author suggests that philosophers in this century have played versions of three different basic philosophical games in their studies of ethics, viz.: (i) providing a definition of the basic ethical terms; (ii) accounting for the persuasiveness of moral statements by considering them as emotive utterances; and (iii) just studying how moral language is used in making moral judgements. All this leads the author to conclude that the ethical writers differ from one another only because they are partial in their approach or have different aims or interests. Thence he proceeds to examine the ancient queries whether ethical judgements are subjective or objective, absolute or relative.

In spite of this valiant effort to show the continuity of the present with the past and the importance of the recent linguistic gimmicks, one is left with the impression that there has been undue occupation on the part of these writers with subsidiary interests. Philosophy in general and moral philosophy in particular await the birth of a new Messiah.

A. K. JIANDANI

Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy. By EDWARD CONZE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 302 pp. 1962. 36*s*.)

Dr. Conze is among the best-known and ablest living exponents of the Buddha-*Dharma* in the West and a volume by him on any aspect of the teachings

of the Master is, indeed, a valuable addition to the growing literature on the subject. Dr. Conze tells us in his preface that it took him thirty years to complete the book; and he adds, somewhat sardonically, that its completion has been delayed and its execution partly spoilt by the new threat to quiet contemplation which was happily unknown in the past:

> No jets ever cut them short at the decisive point. The ideas expounded in this book are only too easily disturbed by the hideous and brutish noises emanating from machines of all kinds. This almost universal noisiness may well be no more than a secondary symptom of an eclipse, which has darkened the spiritual life for many centuries already.

The book opens with this profound thought that noise and the spiritual life are incompatible, and that it is only through meditation and receptivity that we become fit and able to receive ultimate truth. Science deals with that aspect of reality which is revealed to us through the senses; and it is now conceded by the scientists themselves that the sensory world is not the whole of reality. In this book we are told that *dharmas* are more real than things; the images seen in trance, "more real" than the objects of sense-perception; and the unconditioned, "more real" than the conditioned. Mindfulness, Concentration, and Wisdom are the qualities which enable us to penetrate into the true nature of Reality. All conditioned things are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and non-personal. It is only our ignorance that prompts us to seek permanence in what is essentially impermanent; happiness in what is inseparable from suffering; selfhood in what is not linked to any self; and delight in what is essentially repulsive and disgusting. No amount of study or reflection will bring about a full understanding of the three marks and their opposites. Only Mindfulness, Concentration, and Wisdom can help us to realize the true nature of Reality and lead us on to the path of deliverance, which is distinguished by *śūnyatā* (emptiness) and is *animitta* (signless) and *apranihita* (wishless). *Śūnyatā* denotes the emptiness of things. Things are "empty" in the sense that they are unsubstantial and unsatisfactory, and are devoid of reality. It is therefore an antidote to the false view of individuality and opposes the notions of "I" and "mine." The "signless" nature of the path rejects all objects of eye, ear, or any other sense, because sense perceptions disturb the inner tranquillity of the Mind and generate instinctual drives and unwholesome impulses. The restraint of the senses prevents the mind from becoming a playground of unhealthy emotions: and what is seen or heard or felt is placed in an emotional Void which in due course leads to the concept of "Suchness," which takes a thing exactly as it is without adding to or subtracting from it. Naturally one is led on in due course to the state of "Wishlessness" which is also the state of perfect freedom.

It is difficult to summarize the wealth of material contained in this fine work in a short review; but it is a book worth buying and reading over and over again.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

Upanishads, Gītā and Bible: A Comparative Study of Hindu and Christian Scriptures. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. (Faber and Faber, London. 136 pp. 1962. 21*s*.)

In his new book Dr. Geoffrey Parrinder, Reader in the Comparative Study of Religions in the University of London, seeks to elucidate both the points of difference and the points of agreement between Christianity and Hinduism by placing side by side the

teaching of the Upanishads and the *Bhagavad-Gita,* on the one hand, and the teaching of the Bible, on the other. He applies this method successively to the problem of creation, the One and the many, the nature of man, immortality, spiritual discipline and mysticism, conduct and suffering, religion and society. He aims, as he says in the Introduction, at strict impartiality, and he seeks to achieve this end by allowing each religion to speak for itself. He concludes his survey by saying,

> . . . neither [religion] has a complete monopoly of the truth. . . . When we understand each other's holy texts, we may have the grace to appreciate each other's strivings after truth and goodness.

The book certainly forms an instructive and enlightening study in Comparative Religion. Yet in some respects the author displays a lack of insight in his exposition of Hindu teaching. In particular, he fails to appreciate the real greatness and profundity of the Upanishadic doctrine of Brahman. He remarks with reference to Biblical teaching that "while the teaching of immanence may fairly be claimed from the Bible, it never reaches to pantheism. . . . God is ever beyond and greater than nature." He apparently fails to see that precisely the same thing is true of the Upanishads. "Pantheism" is commonly held to imply the pure and simple identification of God with the universe in space and time; and this doctrine cannot rightly be attributed to the Upanishads. While they sometimes declare that the universe is Brahman, they also maintain at the same time that Brahman is immeasurably greater than the universe. It is significant that in the *Shvetashvatara Upanishad,* where the divine transcendence assumes a directly personal form, as "the supreme mighty Lord of lords," the Lord is also identified with human beings. "Man art Thou and woman, boy and maiden, the aged tottering on a staff." (IV. 3) While God is infinitely exalted over all phenomenal being, He takes the form of phenomena, and is their very heart. Similarly in the *Gita* Krishna, who is the incarnation of the Divine, can yet identify himself with the finite: "I am taste in the waters, I am the light of the sun and moon . . .; the life in all beings am I." (VII. ff.) Such assertions are not, as Dr. Parrinder would apparently suggest, inconsistent with the divine transcendence, any more than the Son of Man is inconsistent in the Gospel of Matthew in identifying himself with the least of his brethren (xxv. 4).

Dr Parrinder also fails to do justice to the ethical aspect of the Upanishads. He quotes with approval (on p. 120) Dr. A. B. Keith's assertion that ". . . the ethical content of the Upanishads must be said to be negligible and valueless"; and he says himself that for the Upanishads "ascetic withdrawal is the ideal" (p. 52). It is true that the Upanishads are primarily concerned, not with ethical teaching, but with the attainment of mystical insight; yet they make it abundantly clear that a high degree of moral attainment is essential to the aspirant. Dr. Parrinder suggests that in the Upanishads "the enlightened man . . . becomes indifferent to other people." He quotes Dasgupta's *Hindu Mysticism* in support of this view. But in the passage quoted Dasgupta makes no reference to the Upanishads. How, indeed, is such indifference to others possible if, as the *Isha Upanishad* says, "to one who knows, all beings have become his own self" (verse 7)? The ideal of the Upanishads is not, in truth, "withdrawal from the world" or indifference to it, but rather detachment from the world and the achievement of impersonal activity.

SIDNEY SPENCER

God of a Hundred Names: Prayers of Many Peoples and Creeds. Collected and arranged by BARBARA GREENE and VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 298 pp. 1962. 15*s.*)

"Tell me your beautiful names for God," said the Muslim saint to the Christian missionary, "and I will tell you mine." Materials for the continuation of this conversation may be found in this remarkable collection of the prayers of many peoples and creeds.

Behind the book lies the interest, over many years, of two very different persons: the one, a woman and a practising Roman Catholic; the other, a man who describes himself as "a liberal non-practising Judaeo-Christian." The former had been collecting prayers illustrative of the unity behind and beyond the different creeds. The latter had the intention of collecting prayers expressing the hopes, fears, and spiritual aspirations of mankind. By chance the two came together and have joined their interests and the fruits of their labours in the more modest hope of illustrating one theme:

> From amidst diversified and often warring creeds: over a vast span of history: in the language of many a tribe and many a nation: out of the mouths of the learned and simple, the lowly and great: despite oceans of bloodshed, and torturing inhumanities, and persecutions unspeakable — the single voice of a greater Humanity rises confidently to heaven, saying "We adore Thee, who art One and who art Love: and it is in unity and love that we would live together, doing Thy will."

In fulfilling the limited purpose thus depicted the collaborators seem splendidly to succeed.

The book is divided into three parts covering, in very rough generalization: the daily round; spiritual relationships and realities; aspiration. Within these, each section begins with a meditation. Dates ranging from the thirteenth century B.C. to the present day are given and wherever necessary brief informative notes on the source. An appendix deals simply and adequately with the tenets of the religions involved. The range covered is enormous. Never can there have been such an extraordinary mingling of persons and movements outside the pages of an encyclopædia. The Anglo-Saxon Cynewulf runs alongside the *Rg-Veda*; Epictetus with St. Francis; aborigines from Orissa with Plato; the Hebrew Prayer Book with Robert Burns — and all with an inner logic of the spirit that makes harmony out of these curious juxtapositions — indeed it were better said, reveals an existing harmony.

This is a work of deep perceptivity and delicacy of touch. These qualities are seen both in the collection of material (which must have called for great and sustained diligence) and its arrangement. The same sensitivity is shown in the choice of a Blake drawing for the cover and the leaving of blank pages at the end on which readers may inscribe their own manuscript additions.

This is the kind of thing we expect from Victor Gollancz. He will be the first to acknowledge that his work has been enhanced and complemented by association with so rare a spirit as the hitherto less known collaborator.

MARCUS WARD

Thoughts from the Gita. By R. KRISHNASWAMI AIYAR. (Ganesh and Co., Madras. 181 pp. 1961. 4.00)

A reviewer cannot take up a modern work on the *Bhagavad-Gita* without a feeling of utter scepticism. So much has been said and written on this classic text that nothing seems to have been left for any one to say with any appreciable claim to originality. And yet time and again modern India has produced commentaries that have proved

such doubts to be unfounded, that would be fully justified in laying claim to originality.

Shri Krishnaswami Aiyar's *Thoughts from the Gita* is humbler in its objective and smaller in magnitude, and certainly less original too, than the works by such masters as Gandhi, Shri-Aurobindo, and Vinoba. Nevertheless, this modest book contains a surprisingly clear and coherent attempt to present the main strands in the complex network of Shri-Krishna's teachings. This reviewer can only single out some of the most valuable points made by the erudite author.

Shri Aiyar has done well to emphasize that an understanding of the significance of the context and the situation in which the teachings of the *Gita* are delivered is essential for a proper appreciation of the entire discourse. The setting is not unnatural as many have supposed; on the other hand it does often happen that before one launches into activity there comes about "a moment of inactivity, of thought, of hesitation, of doubt."

Further, Arjuna's situation has been carefully analysed: the "conflict of duties" with which he was faced has been well laid bare; and the subtle nature of his arguments has been illuminated. The author has rightly shown that Arjuna's aversion to fighting was not really due to his "Dharmic consciousness." What Arjuna wanted was "to arrive at a conclusion which will be consistent both with Dharma and his personal feelings." His spirit of renunciation is hardly genuine; for he does not object to fighting as such but only to killing his cousins. It was therefore easy for Shri-Krishna to expose this argument.

Our author, however, goes further and contends that "Shri-Krishna's main teaching, so far as Arjuna was concerned, consisted in the emphasis on the duty to perform the duties prescribed by the scriptures in the spirit of non-attachment. From this it would follow that the teaching of the "higher Jnana is purely incidental in the setting of the *Gita*." This last is a remark that could hardly go unchallenged, though the author is unquestionably right in insisting that Shri-Krishna has not enunciated a "philosophy of action" and that for the *Gita* itself action is only a step towards the attainment of knowledge.

Another most instructive part of this book is the elaborate classification of activity and the rather interesting observations as to the moral and spiritual significance of each of those groups. I should consider this part of the work highly original in a way, and valuable quite irrespective of the question whether the classifications are in accordance with the *Gita* itself. The interpretation of that highly controversial notion of "*swadharma*" as meaning the activities following from what our author calls the "collective impulse," however, is meagrely worked out and is hardly satisfactory. The main trend of the argument as portrayed here is the gradual process of rising up from what are called "Natural Activities" (or those that are fully swayed by nature) to the so-called Congenital Activities (i.e., those that allow some scope for nature but aim at its gradual elimination), and then again from the Congenital Activities to what are called "Forced Activities" (or those that aim at a suppression and direct elimination of nature). *Bhakti* and *Jñāna* are characterized as the objective and the subjective paths respectively, and an illuminating account is given of the notions of *Íśwara* and *Brahman*.

The book may be strongly recommended to those who wish to have a clear understanding of the *Gita* from an orthodox point of view.

J. N. MOHANTY

Ch'an and Zen Teaching. Series Three. Edited, translated and explained by LU K'UAN YU (CHARLES LUK). (Rider and Company, London. 306 pp. Illustrated. 1962. 35*s*.)

The author of this book is a highly qualified student of the Ch'an and Zen schools of mind-training for self-realization which are comprehensively known as Zen. This is the third volume of a series which presents important texts describing the conditions of spiritual enlightenment. The series includes a special commentary translated into English for the first time. For these translations of the Chinese classics, the author's personal experience of Zen meditational techniques is laid under tribute and will be greatly welcomed by all Western students of *The Dharma Treasure of the Altar Sutra* of the Sixth Patriarch. A useful Chinese Appendix of Persons and Terms, as well as a Glossary of Chinese and Sanskrit Names and Places is also supplied.

Students with some acquaintance with Zen will be disappointed not to find any mention of the work of Dr. D. T. Suzuki, of R. H. Blyth, Eugen Herrigal, and Alan W. Watts, not to mention the names of So'kei-an Sasaki, Nyogen Senzaki and Sohaku Ogata, all of whom have made important contributions to the subject.

Notwithstanding the enormous influence of Zen in Asiatic countries, it is extremely unlikely that its impact on the West will be more than superficial. It seems to another contemporary student of Zen, Abraham Kaplan, that Zen does not supply the type of spiritual illumination of which the modern Occidental mind really stands in need.

Another critic of Zen, Arther Koestler, even more roundly condemns Zen as foolish and negative because founded upon rudeness and violence as means to induce spiritual enlightenment, which sounds a blatant contradiction in terms and likely to be deeply resented. But, if so, such resentment will at the same time contradict the essential spirit of Zen, which some think is only like a single hand clapping. To such, Zen will seem degenerative and a hardening of the arteries of the religious instinct implanted in normal men. As Koestler asks, if Zen meditation "is the practice of a mystic technique without mystic content; if there is no God, no Moral Law, no doctrine, no teaching, what is there to meditate about — except repeating a-rose-isarose-isarose, as a means of self-hypnosis?"

VICTOR RIENAECKER

The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai: On Sudden Illumination. Being the Teaching of the Zen Master HUI HAI, known as the Great Pearl. Rendered into English by JOHN BLOFELD (CHU CH'AN). A complete translation of the *Tun Wu Ju Tao Yao Mên Lun* and of the previously unpublished *Tsung Ching Record,* with a Foreword by CHARLES LUK. (Rider and Company, London. 160 pp. 1962. 15*s*.)

John Blofeld's other books have provided much material of interest for the use of students of Zen and of versions of the Mahayana texts. His knowledge of the Chinese written language has gained for him a high place among scholars in that exclusive field. But it is his exceptional sensitiveness to the *inner* meaning of these texts that specially qualifies him as their interpreter. He has added an important Introduction to the present volume and furnished numerous notes and commentaries, as well as some useful explanations of relevant Chinese and Sanskrit terms.

A full understanding of Zen is impossible without an appreciation of the people who have really lived by it and who have ordered all their actions accordingly. In the case of the Japanese,

it reflects the bizarre and paradoxical characteristics of their social habits and their arts including the Nōh drama, painting, flower arrangement, the tea ceremony, gardens, and the philosophy of the sword.

Zen must not be thought of as a religion in the ordinary Western sense; for it employs no sacred books or symbols, adheres to no dogma or theology or form of ritual. It is said that Zen cannot be conveyed in words, and yet of course to say even this is to convey something. A Zen master will employ language, not for what it *says* to a man but what it actually *does* to him. Its significance lies in its pragmatics rather than its semantics. The sayings of the Zen masters are to be regarded as Wittgenstein advises a reader to use the propositions of his own *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: that is to say he is to climb out "through them, on them, over them" — and then throw away the ladder.

Despite the incommunicability of Zen in words, it will surely appear strange to the reader of these texts to find that they consist of a series of verbal questions and answers, at the same time that he is meant to understand that verbal constructions can never lift him into life itself. For language is a convention of symbolization, and Zen would have him forget that he is dealing with symbols and will not allow him to mistake the convention for the truths they symbolize.

If we are not allowed to believe that language can symbolize something which we can accept, what are we left with of any significance, a vessel containing only a void?

VICTOR RIENAECKER

Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries. By GEORGE E. MYLONAS. (Princeton University Press, New Jersey. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 346 pp. 88 Plates. 1961. 60*s*.)

Dr. Mylonas's excellent book is to some extent the record of a lost endeavour. Attracted from early youth by the unsolved problem of the content and meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries, he has devoted himself to the task of sifting all the evidence, literary and archæological, as well as the theories of other investigators, only to be compelled in the end to admit defeat. We do know, of course, that "the initiates returned from their pilgrimage to Eleusis full of joy and happiness, with the fear of death diminished and the strengthened hope of a better life in the world of shadows." Such exalted spirits as Pindar and Sophocles testify to this fact. "For two thousand years," says Dr. Mylonas, "civilized humanity was sustained and ennobled by these rites." As early as the end of the seventh century B.C. the author of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, a superb poet and himself no doubt an initiate, recounts in a poem of some five hundred lines the legend on which the cult was based. In Roman times, in the middle of the first century B.C. both Cicero and his friend Atticus were initiated. They were agreed that among all the splendid institutions created by Athens none had contributed more than these Mysteries to human life. "By their means we have been brought out of our barbarous and savage mode of life and educated and refined to a state of civilization." We cannot doubt the impressiveness of the rite, but in what did it consist?

It lasted nine days and was enacted each year. We know that it embodied something in the nature of an acted spectacle. We do not know what the action was. We know that spoken words were an essential part of the performance. Only Greek-speakers were admitted. But we do not know what was said. We know that at the culmination of the rite sacred objects were shown.

We do not know what they were. Nothing about the Mysteries is more strange than the silence in which they remained wrapped, the reserve with which the vast number of initiates observed their secret. In one passage in ancient literature it seems that the veil is about to be lifted. The topographer and archæologist Pausanias (end of the second century A.D.), having brought his readers to the doors of the shrine speaks of himself as "just about to start on a description of all that it contained when he was warned by a vision that he must not impart such information to the profane." That was the nearest the outsider ever came to knowing what he would so much like to know.

Significantly too the Christian Fathers who attack the Mysteries were all outsiders. It might have been expected that some initiate would have been converted to Christianity and have felt himself absolved from his oath of secrecy. But there is no trace of any such person. Some of the Christian attacks on the Mysteries are verbose and scurrilous. They are not among the most edifying documents of the early Church and they do not yield the analyst any solid information, except, indeed, the not insignificant fact that the Mysteries were felt in some sense to be rivals of the new faith.

In every department of his enquiry, Dr. Mylonas has done his job thoroughly. The archæological evidence, much of it new, is carefully displayed in text and illustrations. The examination of the ancient literary sources is complete. The Early Fathers could not complain that their confused attacks have not been patiently heard. The speculations (one can hardly say findings) of modern researchers have had their full meed of attention. Thus there is built up in our minds a pretty full picture of the externals of the cult, while we are warned that the substance and meaning of the Mysteries still elude our grasp. The rites, whatever they were, must have had some infusion of wisdom and imagination capable of leaving a permanent impression on the participants. But I could wish that Dr. Mylonas had said more about the motive for secrecy in the conduct of the cult. This secrecy is the one thing that blunts my curiosity and lessens my belief in the civilizing mission of the cult. The main civilizing process in pagan antiquity was carried on in the open, by its political institutions, its philosophical and scientific schools, its theatre and literature in general. And the religion which finally triumphed over the Mysteries was a gospel, an evangel, a piece of good news, which anyone who received it was encouraged, not to hide under a bushel, but to make known to all and sundry.

BENJAMIN FARRINGTON

The Basis of Scientific Thinking. By SAMUEL REISS. (Philosophical Library, New York. 262 pp. 1961. $4.75)

The author's "psycho-logic" approach to the solution of problems pertaining to the phenomena of the inanimate and the animate world is based on the hypothesis that any concept-formulation regarding either science or biology should be viewed in its "simultaneous" psychological and logical aspects. The word-sound relationship or "language" sets up psychological activity at the unconscious level of the mind and results in a thought, which is appreciated by the mind as its "meaning content." Meaning always implies concepts at the unconscious level.

The "psycho-logic" approach presumes an understanding of the concept of "polar-related pairs." In polar-related pairs each one of the pair involves the other, in the aspect of "oppositeness." This presupposes an awareness of the nature of opposites. Such pairs, e.g.,

are: "structure — function"; "matter — mind"; and "part — whole." "Psycho-logic" interpretation is not of the nature of a philosophical elucidation. It tries to explain all systems of knowledge from the fundamental standpoint of how a living mind formulates knowledge. Naturally, the autonomy of each branch of science is denied. Physics cannot be the basic science the physicist thinks it is; for there is the biologic element brought in by the interpretation given to the observed objective phenomena by the mind of the physicist. In "psycho-logic" the interrelationship between the objective world and human thought is put on a scientific basis and the merging of the objective aspect of life with the subjective is accepted. The author clearly points out how the biologist's attempts to explain life or the physicist's to explain some property of matter involve them in logical difficulties, which can only be avoided by taking a psycho-logic view.

By the adoption of the concepts of "limitless space" and "time without duration" parapsychic phenomena like telepathy and clairvoyance, which have still to get recognition from all scientists, have been put on a logical basis.

The author has pointed out that a "machine" may do some things better than man but cannot think. It needs an "initiator" to formulate a plan and this can only be a man and not another machine.

The "psycho-logic" approach would help in a scientific way towards a clear understanding of some parapsychological phenomena, the problem of the mind and the machine, and the interrelationship of the various branches of knowledge. "It is necessary to see beyond what you see," says the author and that sentence puts in a nutshell the message he tries to communicate. He is to be congratulated on expounding a method of reconciling "psycho-logically" the views of science and philosophy, and establishing the "unitary nature" of life by showing that matter and mind are but two interdependent aspects of Creation.

M. PUTTAIYA

Le Morte Darthur: The Book of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table. By THOMAS MALORY. (University Books, Inc., New Hyde Park, New York. 432+530 pp. 1961. $15.00)

This magnificently produced one-volume unexpurgated Malory is based on A. W. Pollard's Medici Society edition (1920) in modernized spelling. Those who have had their first initiation to the Arthurian legends only through Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* would find the plunge into Malory both exciting and exhilarating. These tales of kings, queens, knights, ladies, jousts, sieges, battles, amours, and liaisons seem to intersect as a complicated web; the strange names so charged with romance seem to play hide and seek; and the chivalric patterns seem to change kaleidoscopically — yet, although one feels confused and even scandalized, one knows one must read on and on, one cannot lay the book down. In the range of its strife and destruction, *Le Morte Darthur* almost recalls the *Mahabharata*; in the ramifications of its romance, it recalls likewise *The Tale of Genji*. But of course these comparisons are misleading, for *Le Morte Darthur* is unique; it is mediaeval and European, it is the testament of romance and chivalry. Mr. John C. Wilson, in his Introduction to the present edition, points out that it comprises eight tales, but actually the tales are not easily separable. There is the base-plant of the romance, the tale of Arthur and Guinevere and Launcelot; and, running parallel to it (as the Gloucester story stands in relation to the main story in *King Lear*), there is the tale of

Mark and Iseult and Tristram; and affiliated to them, yet transcending them, there is the tale of Galahad's quest of the Holy Grail. These three tales meet at various points, and, although one feels often lost as in a tropical jungle, one can also see them all as a complex whole. There is an obvious fatality in the adulterous love that possesses Launcelot and Guinevere on the one hand, and Tristram and Iseult on the other; and such love, for all its ardour and agony, must needs end in tragedy; and Malory misses neither the poetry nor the pity. Alongside of this riot of the love mundane, there is also Galahad's burning brazier of the love divine — his ceaseless quest of the Holy Grail, the culminating ecstasy, the ultimate release:

> And then he began to tremble right hard when the deadly flesh began to behold the spiritual things. . . . . And therewith he kneeled down to-fore the table and made his prayers, and then suddenly his soul departed to Jesu Christ. . . .

The paradox of the book is that, while its hero, Arthur, is the prototype of the Christian king, it also brings into play many elements other than Christian. There is "magic" in the air, and Merlin is Arthur's mentor; chivalric courtly love is often stronger than holy wedded love; and there is the "unorthodox" mystery and symbolism of the Grail. We traverse the whole gamut from hell to heaven, taking all Purgatory in our stride; but there is no doubt the Grail is the mystic crown of the whole edifice. Miss Jessie L. Weston has shown, in her *From Ritual to Romance,* that the Grail actually goes back to remote pre-Christian times, almost to the childhood of the human race. It was Malory's genius that integrated the Grail in terms of romance with the received Christian ethic and the current chivalric modes. That the Grail is no spent force in modern times is illustrated in different ways by the music of Wagner and the poetry of Tennyson. More recently still, Mrs. Hannah Closs returned to the inspiration of the Grail in her three novels — *High Are the Mountains, And Sombre the Valleys,* and *The Silent Tarn* — on the Albigensian heresy.

K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar

The Flowering Hawthorne. By Hugh Ross Williamson. Illustrated by Clare Leighton. (Peter Davis, London. 119 pp. Illustrated. 1962. 16*s*.)

Every religion has its charming stories to decorate its weightier philosophy; they may be factually true or purely fictional; they are still true in Keats's sense of "Beauty is Truth." Here is told the legend of the Hawthorn at Glastonbury, blooming twice a year, summer and winter, associated with a "secret" disciple of Jesus, Joseph of Arimathea. It is told beautifully, with woodcuts to illustrate. Travellers to Britain should read this book, find their way to Glastonbury, and experience for themselves the quiet enchantment of the place.

Ernest V. Hayes

Tennyson Laureate. By Valerie Pitt. (Barrie and Rockliff, London. xi+292 pp. 1962. 45*s*.)

Tennyson's rocketting reputation is one of the showpieces of twentieth-century criticism. Hardly had the late Victorian castle of adulation been mined and blown up than cultural salvage-men began poking about among the ruins, to restore or rebuild them in another shape. The replacements tend to lack ground-plan and design; but Miss Valerie Pitt has favoured an all-over survey with an eye to homogeneity. Her

title is somewhat ambiguous: *Laureate* may indicate a crowning of the bust with green, refurbished laurels as an all-conquering bard. Or it may toll ironically for the submergence of an honest writer under the grandiloquent trappings of the State.

Miss Pitt is drawn to neither of these extremities though decidedly nearer to the first than the second alternative. The general argument underlying her complexities of analysis is Tennyson's development from a private to a public writer. The early Tennyson, wrapped up in his own neurotic and frequently morbid sensibility, instinctively withdrew from common life. Sensuous moods of dream and fantasy, remote as his "Palace of Art" from the normal paths of men, enshrouded him until his virile, extrovert Cambridge friends aroused his dormant sense of responsibility to a moral and social world. The death of Hallam, with its challenge — met at last in the course of "In Memoriam" — to come out from indulgence in a private grief, gave him the needed experience and proved a turning-point. Poised between his inner and outer world, he entered on a struggle between the irresponsible dream and the awareness of an upper-class contemporary scene that he was able to paint with an almost pre-Raphaelite detail.

As a sturdy modern extrovert and something of an anti-Romantic, Miss Pitt, in the course of much skilful and illuminating dissection, fully upholds this emergence, which was of course consolidated by the requirements of the Laureateship. The later Tennyson's uncanny ability to make resounding moral verse out of the political and military exploits of his age in no way daunts Miss Pitt as a critic of poetry. One is probably old-fashioned to suggest that melody and astonishment of diction harden up when the wistful-piping poet turns trumpeter. But she takes us beyond this public triumph to delve up some curious aspects of the Laureate's reactions to Victorian disintegrating culture. A stimulating if controversial study.

SYLVA NORMAN

A Flight of Swans: Poems from Balākā. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. Translated by AUROBINDO BOSE. (John Murray, London. 116 pp. Second edition, 1962. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

William Cullen Bryant may be a forgotten name among the poetry-lovers of today. But his poem "To a Waterfowl" was for a long time a favourite in the anthologies of English and American poetry, and it was this which inspired Tagore to write his *Balākā*. *Balākā* means "a crane." Those who have seen the flight of cranes at the approach of autumn in the foothills of the Himalayas will readily grasp the significance of the opening stanza of the present collection: the whirring of the birds' wings in flight fills the air, the whole atmosphere throbs "as though the entire Creation would speak and yet is unable to deliver its message. . . ." Tagore drew his message from the symbols the birds presented, and the English title of the book is derived — wittingly or unwittingly — from *The Wild Swans at Coole* of W. B. Yeats, who was the first to sponsor Tagore to the Western public.

Tagore was an eclectic, and it is a pity that the translator in his introduction makes no reference to the various streams that fed Tagore's perennial Hippocrene and made his *Balākā* a volume of outstanding beauty, a significant landmark in Bengali literature. *A Flight of Swans* was first issued in 1955. The present edition is a revised one. Apparently it has satisfied a demand. It received high praise in different quarters when it first came out. But the translator's too close adherence

to the original words has been unfortunate for his English; and there are some inaccurate translations.

SUDHIN GHOSE

Sanskrit Literature: Talks broadcast over All India Radio. Selected and edited by V. RAGHAVAN. (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi. 115 pp. 1961. Rs. 1.50); *A Handbook of Classical Samskrit Literature*. By U. VENKATAKRISHNA RAO. Orient Longmans, Ltd., Madras. 249 pp. Second revised ed., 1961. Rs. 3.50).

Among the reassessments of our classical Sanskrit literature attempted by Indian scholars in recent times, these two books deserve a conspicuous place.

The first is "a collection of short studies of Sanskrit language and literature and some of its major works and authors, delivered as talks by scholars at the different stations of All India Radio." There are in all twenty-three talks, of which fourteen are from the pen of the learned editor himself. Besides general surveys of the Sanskrit language and literature, there are brief and dependable accounts of almost all the highlights in the Vedic, epic, and classical periods; and they combine to give a kind of unity. The book reveals the editor's careful selection and arrangement, and is sure to achieve its aim of arousing a wide general interest in Sanskrit literature. The talks by experts on the masters of Sanskrit poetry, prose, drama, etc., succeed in being at once informative and interesting. Sometimes we find deviations from the beaten track of familiar Western opinions, as in the case of Bhāsa, who is assigned to a period from the sixth to the third century B.C. (p. 55).

The style of the learned editor himself is a model of scholarly compression, which at times lands him into English constructions not very happy:—

> With the collyrium of knowledge, Vyasa provided indeed a feast for one's vision and mind (p. 25).

> As the essence of his personality, Kalidasa has bequeathed to us a sense of the lovely and the beautiful which has become part of us (p. 65).

> The interest of the Harshacharita is rare and manifold; it is a literary performance in history . . . (p. 72).

One wonders also why diacritical marks for Sanskrit names have been avoided.

We hope that such collections of enduring value will be regularly published by the Publications Division.

Professor Rao calls his work a "handbook" mainly intended as a text for degree students in Indian universities. With his long experience of teaching, he has succeeded in making his book both readable and stimulating. His critical estimates are studded with apt quotations from Sanskrit and English sources which will be very much liked by students. In the span of ten small chapters he has surveyed all the Sanskrit literary *genres* against the background of the epics, noting important works even up to the eighteenth century. It is thus practically more helpful to the Indian student as a reference book than many others in the field today. But, on the debit side, it has to be mentioned that the author has a *penchant* for controversy and novelty of approach, not at all suited for a handbook of this kind, however admirable elsewhere. Some of his statements are too dogmatic to command universal acceptance; e.g.:

> The title [" Kumārasambhava"], it should be noted, should not be translated as the Birth of Kumāra. It is *kumārārthaḥ sambhavaḥ*, not *kumārasya sambhavaḥ* . . . (p. 74).

> Lyric poetry has been defined as *utkaṇṭhāviracitapadaṁ geyaṁ* or song in which the language is conditioned by the emotion surging in the breast (p. 116).

One wishes the author had eschewed controversy altogether and reserved his own theories on chronological questions (e.g., Kalidasa's contemporaneity with Agnimitra) for research publications. But, in a way, it serves as a useful complement to the texts on the subject in use in our universities today. Though diacritical marking is often defective, the book is free from serious misprints and the get-up is good. It deserves a place in every college library.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Foundations of Indian Culture. By K. M. MUNSHI. (76 pp.); *The Determining Periods of Indian History*. By K. M. PANIKKAR. (68 pp.) (Both Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 1962. Each Re. 1.00; 1*s*. 6*d*.; 50 cents.)

The Foundations of Indian Culture contains a series of lectures. Having been a pupil of the great Shri-Aurobindo Ghose, the author is indeed well fitted to discourse on Indian culture.

Shri Munshi confesses that, in his early student days, he was among the many who, considering themselves progressives, scoffed at the cultural heritage of their own country; but he found the right path through the study of ancient Indian history and was further inspired by the example of Aurobindo Ghose, his own professor of English, who, though an absolutely Westernized Bengali at one time, later became a dedicated yogi.

The book shows scholarship and a sincere devotion to his subject. The author stresses that the material equipment of life does not constitute culture, and exhorts the modern generation of Indians to be the "torchbearers of a living Indian culture for the age in which they live and for the future."

The Determining Periods of Indian History comprises three lectures, of a uniformly high quality.

The first marks the emergence of the earliest conception of Bharata Varsha, or India, as one united imperial dominion. During this epoch (350 to 250 B.C.) was evolved a form of political administration which influences Indian administration to this day.

The impact on India of the Muslim conquest and the ultimate triumphant survival of Hindu culture forms the theme of the second lecture.

In the last, the author discusses the effect of Western civilization on India at a moment when her culture appeared to be decaying, and stresses the prominent part played by the English language in the reunification of India.

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

Under the Shelter of Bapu. By BALWANTSINHA. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 227 pp. 1962. Rs. 3.50)

"All those who sought Gandhiji's guidance and protection," says Vinoba Bhave in a Foreword to this book, "inevitably grew up to attain their full stature — mentally, morally and spiritually. The impure became pure, the harsh mellow, the timid fearless." Shri Balvantsinha, one of the many who came under Gandhiji's influence during the struggle for Independence, unfolds the technique that Gandhiji employed. The narrative reveals the manner in which the sieving process, which the Mahatma had perfected, brought to his disciples and to the author that heightened state of awareness which made evolution inevitable.

The author relates the circumstances which led to his leaving the army to participate in the Gandhian odyssey, his acceptance in the Sabarmati Ashram, to a long term of political imprisonment

and release, and to his appointment as kitchen supervisor at Sevagram and, later, as manager of the dairy and farmlands belonging to the settlement. At every step Gandhiji's guidance was available, not only for the subduing of a highly tempestuous nature but for the minutiae of everyday life. Nothing was too trivial for Bapu to attend to. We see him supervising the grinding of corn, planning menus, tending lepers, prescribing nature-cure remedies for invalids, successfully handling difficult Ashramites and obdurate Viceroys, planning political campaigns, spinning, fasting, leading prayer meetings, and looking after the cleanliness of the Ashram.

> There is much filth and refuse lying around the Ashram [he writes in a Note to the inmates]. Someone from amongst us should undertake the responsibility of keeping the surroundings clean. . . . It need hardly be emphasized that cleanliness is an essential part of non-violence.

Shri Balvantsinha's candid un-self-conscious presentation of his material, a certain natural shrewdness of disposition, and his devotion to an ideal add to the merit of a book which is primarily a Testament of Regeneration. It underscores the truth of Shankaracharya's dictum: "The company of the truly noble even for a moment, becomes for us a boat for crossing the treacherous sea of the world. . . ."

HILLA C. VAKEEL

The Santals. By CHARULAL MUKHERJEA. (A. Mukherjee and Co., Calcutta. 459 pp. 14 Illustrations. Revised second edition, 1962. Rs. 20.00)

This monograph is the result of the investigations conducted by the author when he was a practising lawyer at Dumka in the Santal Parganas and in Mayurbhunj in 1933. He enjoyed the friendship of the late Rai Bahadur S. C. Roy, who saw the MS. of the first edition (1940, limited to 100 copies) of this book, and whose method he has followed in the main. This second edition well deserves the patronage the West Bengal Government gave it in 1958-9.

The Santals in India were not enumerated in the 1961 Census, out of a reformist zeal to abolish the castes and the tribes, but the 1951 Census had recorded 2,811,578 Santals, which are mostly found in Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. The present monograph restricts itself to the Santals inhabiting Mayurbhunj and the Santal *parganas* of West Bengal. The author has faithfully described the cultural and social life of the people and has succeeded in preparing a readable story unspoilt by the heavy technical jargon of professional anthropologists. The Santals in this locality once lived a semi-hunting nomadic life, but they have now accepted the life of settled agriculturists. The economic life of these people is indissolubly linked up with their religious and clan features. Sometimes clan ties are stronger than family ties.

As a lawyer, the author has had numerous opportunities of studying the customary tribal law of the Santals, and behind this lies the tribal psychology which the author has tried to explain. The tribals consider tribal solidarity and strength to be their first concern and their fears of tribal pollution are not dictated by any moral feelings or any sense of tribal aristocracy. Sexual errors are objected to owing to an instinctive fear of the mysterious dangerous power infecting the erring woman and her family, which is expected to prove as contaminating and destructive as death.

The chapters on the "Social Fabric," "Kinship Organization," and Santal religion and folklore are interesting examples of lucid writing based on the

author's own collection of folk literature, though he freely quotes from S. C. Roy, Campbell, and Risley. The author makes no use of such other books on the Santals as those by the Rev. P. O. Bodding, D. N. Datta-Majumdar, or Dr. P. C. Biswas, but his own book has an unimpaired charm and originality.

The Santals, like other communities in India, are undergoing a social change from within, are anxious to introduce social reforms for the maintenance of their tribal honour. They are anxious to give up drinking and to take to the prohibition movement. They have given up eating carrion; educated Santals are giving up also dancing on the hillside and in public places, restricting themselves to dances within their houses and villages. This does rob them of one of the joys of life, but perhaps this is unavoidable in the changing times. Some of the aboriginals are holding Ministers' posts in Government and are coming into contact with the highest in the land. It is true that the capacity to take kindly to modern civilization varies greatly with different tribes, but it is satisfactory to note the opinion of the experienced author that the modernization has not produced any noticeable adverse effect, especially in the cases of certain observed phenomena like punishment for witchcraft, murders for human sacrifice to tribal deities, and the wholesale application of Mitakshara Law as the personal tribal law in Mayurbhunj. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent the normal Santal developing into the normal rural citizen in due course.

P. G. SHAH

Traditions of the Indian Army. By DHARM PAL. (A National Book Trust Book. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. 147 pp. 1961. Re. 1.75)

In his excellent Foreword, General Cariappa bestows well-merited praise on this book, the first of its kind he has seen.

The author has taken his material from an ample storehouse, for the pages of Indian history glitter with deeds of bravery and chivalry. Heroic martial deeds of the past and the present, are recounted with a pride that all must share, as it is of such stuff that traditions are formed.

The various facets of regimental life are portrayed in all their colour and romance, and the salient traits of the different classes that form the Indian Army are delineated with insight and accuracy.

Military traditions in India, which have their roots in a great past, were strengthened under the British régime, and the author acknowledges the important role played by British officers in building up that magnificent feeling of regimental honour so apparent in the Indian Army today.

Dr. Dharm Pal pays noble tributes wherever merited, and these records of bravery are a source of pride not only for the Indian Army but for the whole nation.

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

Frank Buchman's Secret. By PETER HOWARD (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 154 pp. 1962. Rs. 2.00 [in India] Rs. 2.25 [outside]).

The author, before he joined the Moral Re-armament movement, was a brilliant journalist. The present book is the outcome of his moral adventure.

Frank Buchman is a wonder of our century. In the present environment of moral depravity and corruption, here was a man who thought and lived in

global terms. He tried to unite the peoples of the world by cutting through the prejudices of colour, class, and creed. Before his death, he said, "Why not let God run the whole world?" That gives us the keynote of his life.

In this pleasing narrative, Howard uses his pungent political pen for a different purpose, and in eleven chapters and two supplements, takes us to the inner spirit of a great and noble man. Buchman lived in the faith and experience that human nature can be changed, and for that ideal he gave humanity the programme of his absolute moral standards. The author has been able to portray the true core of his faith.

Let me quote the spirited concluding words:

> The world talks about peace, but prepares for war. Buchman saw that peace was not just an idea, but people becoming different, and that the true peace-makers were those inclined to pay the price of it by giving their lives to bring millions under God's control. That was his life and his secret.
>
> Go and do thou likewise.

Everyone should read this inspiring book.

MATILAL DAS

Practical Metaphysics of Zoroastrianism. By MINOCHEHER HORMASJI TOOT. (R. S. Dhondy, Bombay 7. 117 pp. 2nd ed., 1962.)

The book, as mentioned in the first edition of 1957, is a collection of writings in the *Kaiser-i-Hind,* at different times. This is the second edition (1962). Except for the third chapter of thirty-eight pages, the chapters are short summary statements. The author has novel ideas and meanings to offer — interesting and thought-provoking. But the very title of the book is a contradiction, inasmuch as the subject of metaphysics cannot be practical, as expounded by the author (p. 61 *et seq.*) himself. What he means to convey is the practical ethics reflected in manual labour and its dignity in the scheme of religion. The book also sadly suffers from many misprints. His summaries of the Gathas are very sketchy. Chapter V on the Fivefold Systems in the Five Gathas can be better read and understood in Shri Bulsara's *Religion of Zarathustra* (Kama Oriental Institute Publications, No. 32.)

If these defects are removed, the book will make interesting and stimulating reading for the layman. The author has a spiritual bent of mind, and hence a spiritual interpretation of the Zoroastrian concepts of the *Amesha Spentas* and the *Yazatas,* and of the philosophical ideas of Good and Evil.

"NADEEM"

LEAVES FROM A LAUSANNE DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra** gives us an appealing introduction to the profound thought of Teilhard de Chardin, the Christian thinker who is both philosopher and scientist.—ED.]

VERY FEW reach the summit; many catch a glimpse of it. Ananda Coomaraswamy once said: "All differences exist below, but they vanish at the peak." Perhaps no European in this century has sought so earnestly, through right thoughts and right conduct, to reach the summit as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. He did doubtless catch a glimpse of the magnificence which ought to be the Earth of Man.

I have been reading and re-reading his books, *Les Unités humaines nouvelles, L'avenir de l'homme,* and *Réflexions*

sur le bonheur, in which Teilhard de Chardin's vision of the future might recall to some Shri-Aurobindo's *Ideal of Human Unity*; but I feel inclined only to speak about some aspects, brighter than a myriad stars, of this great philosopher-scientist's thought. Many will be reminded of Vivekananda and other Indian saints, to whom such thinking is not unusual, but no European has for a long time encompassed the whole world with such warmth and luminosity. De Chardin calls on everyone to unite in building their universal Citadel. "The Age of Nations is past. The task before us now, if we would not perish, is to build the Earth." How are we to do that? De Chardin has a magnificent answer:

> Remain on your own line, but move ever upwards towards greater consciousness and greater love. At the summit you will find yourselves united with all those who, from every direction, have made the great ascent. For everything that rises must converge.

Yes, indeed. The peoples of the earth must, he says, achieve terrestrial harmony through the variety of their racial characteristics — characteristics which reciprocally enrich each other.

As a scientist, Teilhard de Chardin talks about human beings like cells which are cast away, dead but re-born. The good cells are there to help man to live and the dead and decayed ones come no more. To him, just as the various cells and members of the body grow and develop to form a single living being and find their ultimate perfection only by constituting that being, so the constant goal of individual and national development should be the unity of mankind, which individuals and nations are called upon to achieve if they are to live to the full. An admirer of Teilhard de Chardin, Max Bégouën, talks about the "Vanguard of the Crusade for Human Advancement." I am not at all sure whether the word "crusade," which has unpleasant overtones, should be used in this, but we know what he means when he says: "Love, the supreme form of energy, does not make demands; it strives and progresses."

Teilhard de Chardin is not just a supreme optimist. We all are if we believe that we shall some day in this or a future life reach the summit. But the truth was this: de Chardin had no use for defeatists. This defeatism, whether it be innate or acquired, or a mere affectation, seemed to him to be the besetting temptation of our time. Defeatism is invariably unhealthy and impotent, and, he went on to add, unjustified.

A few have "stained the white radiance of eternity." Mankind, to Teilhard de Chardin, represents the culmination of the whole movement of matter and life. The new "human phenomenon" is a supremely characteristic form of the cosmic phenomenon and has an incalculable moral range; it transforms our values, and guarantees the permanency of the work we are doing. And then, his great insight makes him say something which a good many of us, in the East and West, keep forgetting: our age is weary of the sectionalism which confines human sympathies in watertight compartments. It is not the fear of perishing, Teilhard de Chardin points out, but the ambition to live which has thrown man into the exploitation of Nature, into the conquest of the ethereal and on the skyways.

Talking about Man and Woman, Teilhard de Chardin says:

> Between Man and Woman, a specific and reciprocal power of sensitization and spiritual fertilization seems in truth to be slumbering still, and calling to be released in an irresistible upsurge towards everything which is truth and beauty.

And again:

> When a man loves a woman nobly, the

result of this overmastering passion, which exalts the being above life itself, is that the life of that man, his power to create and to feel, his whole Universe, become specifically contained, as well as sublimated, in his love of that woman. And yet, Woman, however necessary to Man, in order to reflect, reveal, communicate and "personalize" the world to him, is still not the centre of the World.

Teilhard de Chardin is convinced that Love, the supreme human energy, has grown all around. He says, with a feeling of certainty, peoples are being brought together, effortlessly, by virtue of the properties of Love.

In the new world which Teilhard believes is coming, coercion would become unnecessary for the purpose of restraining individuals in the most favourable order for action, of orienting them in free will, accepting restrictions and sacrifices, not to squander the capacity of love but to sublimate it jealously to the end of ultimate action. To bring about such a world we all have a part to play by our thoughts and the peaceful radiations we can spread around. These could increase endlessly the capacities of the forces which are for ever mounting and in consequence converging.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

The Bishop of Woolwich, Dr. John A. T. Robinson, has shown himself a brave and sincere Christian, prepared to make sacrifices in his search for truth. Yet neither he nor the S.C.M. Press, the publishers of his book, *Honest to God,* that appeared last March, had apparently any idea of how amazingly the public would respond to his "break-through" of the barrier of orthodoxy. The first printing (6,000 copies) was sold out in half a day, and two further impressions had to be put in hand at once, the first being immediately over-subscribed.

The Bishop's theme is that, thanks to science, the old mental idols of a personal God "up there," above the physical sky, are well and truly on the scrap-heap. Even the more metaphysical conceptions of a supernatural, creative presence "out there" beyond the confines of manifested space and time, grows more and more difficult of credence. So Dr. Robinson, in an attempt to satisfy those for whom traditional theology is now meaningless, has endeavoured to find an image for God that shall be free from "religion," its connotations and colouring, and has gone to the psychologists for a term to suggest a getting back to fundamentals, a return to root origins. That term is "depth." It is through the depths of human existence and consciousness that man approaches the ultimate and hidden Reality, which we can only name "god."

Dr. Robinson has been influenced by such liberal theologians as Bonhoeffer, Bultman, and, still more by the most profound and universal of them all, Paul Tillich. But these theologians have all remained more or less unknown to the general public. The Bishop has brought the whole question of the nature of God home to the man in the train or the bus, on his daily journey to work. The need for some greater satisfaction than the old orthodoxies

can give is evidenced by the rush to buy the book. Even leaving out of reckoning the curiosity-mongers, and those who, resenting an attack on *their* beliefs, have bought it, in order to write indignant letters to the press, there still remains a most encouraging response to this new (yet in reality ancient) concept of Divinity.

The problem of women's education, especially in rural areas, is the main theme of UNESCO's *International Journal of Adult and Youth Education* (Vol. XIV, No. 3). The issue is based on an inquiry made during 1962, similar to the 1959 one on adult education in general. The present subject is of great importance in those countries where women have had no education in childhood, and later have been centred only on the family and home. Now, under the impact of change, they are eagerly grasping at, or are being forced to accept, a larger and more public life.

Marya Kos writes about Yugoslavia, where economic and industrial development has produced profound social changes. At present 72 per cent of the women can neither read nor write. Even the reading groups organized by the women's societies after the last war made little progress, for lack of earlier training. Now, in addition to vocational training, there is offered (beginning where the women are already involved) further knowledge about nutrition and health education, accommodation, clothing, etc.

In Moslem Tunisia the women have been so confined that the girls have to learn how to handle things and to make even the most elementary arrangement on their own. An unaccompanied expedition on some very simple business is part of their education, a liberation from subservience and exaggerated prudery. The other aspect, that of school training, has to create and nourish the thirst for knowledge and responsibility.

In France the subject of education is linked with the status of women, usually without vocational training, who, as housewives, have little leisure.

In India, in principle women are emancipated, but in practice far from it. Raising standards of living, writes S. C. Dutta, should be accompanied by preparation for political and social responsibility. New experiments comprise "condensed courses" (chiefly residential) to inculcate social values as well as academic studies.

In Southern Italy, Angelo Zucconi affirms the potentiality for social leadership among the women, but they have always been kept "passively aloof from all vital community issues and activities." It is hard going in the face of strong opposition, and the fields open to women are few, though there are small hopeful signs like the pilot project for the Abruzzi.

Hila Perera writes of the literacy campaign among the women of Cuba, and here, too, training has to start at the only possible level, the domestic one, though more is hoped for the future. Emphasis on the academic rather than the political aspect of education is encouraged.

Woman has too often been treated as essentially inferior, instead of as a thinking being, as fully self-conscious and responsible as her male counterpart. If the present ferment can bring about a better balance between the two, it will be a happy outcome. But it is to be hoped that these women now on new thresholds of awareness will not repeat the educational mistakes too often made by the urbanized nations, with their spirit of competition and destructive materialistic values.

Writing on "Civilization, Sex, and Morals" in *The Sunday Times* (Weekly Review, 17 February 1963), the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Ramsey, gives his diagnosis of present evils and

obsessions. He cites the two opposing outlooks defined by that fine philosopher-statesman, the late Lord Samuel — first, the treatment of sex relations as a casual matter, of marriage as experimental, and of children as only of secondary importance; and second, the affirmation of the stability of affection, of marriage, home, and family. Many people have become casualties of the present confusions.

The Archbishop sees the unity of love as comprising different aspects needing to be integrated for complete fulfilment. *Eros,* the desire for, and *Venus,* the expression of the joy of, union, must both be complemented by *Philia,* "the whole range of comradeship in life," and *Agape,* "the divine self-giving kind of love without which the rest may go astray." He sees the present-day obsession with sex as largely due to

> the many frustrations which beset people, insecurities, their want of fulfilment, their lack of meaningfulness in work or home or human relations, their lack of significance for the *ego* — these drive them to find in Venus a realm where they can succeed. In the adventures and sensations of Venus there is the chance to achieve, to dominate, to win, to enjoy, to prove to oneself and to others. . . . But if society's frustrations create the preoccupations with Venus, it in turn deepens and extends those frustrations.

As a means of escape, it is a delusion. It produces cancerous delusions, the fallacy that Venus alone is "the substance of marriage," on which success in marriage solely depends. In reality, it depends on "character, patience, forbearance in living together." Physical maladjustments are the effect of inner disturbances. An equally dangerous error is the idea that

> the best readiness for marriage will be a training in sexual experience and techniques. This assumption helps to encourage the widespread increase of pre-nuptial unchastity. There comes the tragic fallacy that the spread of pre-matrimonial sexual experience makes for better and happier marriages. In truth, this misconceives the nature of the marriage relationship and increases in society the severance of the elements from which that relationship is made.

Dr. Ramsey indicates that, since this obsession with sex has been largely fostered by mental conditioning, the problem will be lessened if the mind can be given another bent, can be lit by some true understanding of sex, and of "the motives, the ends and the pattern of our civilization and the role of home and family, men and women in it." He writes, naturally, as a Christian, and in a short article can only give pointers, but it may be noted that, in ancient India, the emphasis was on marriage as a reflection of divinity, and on the family as the basic unit of community life. Today, disastrously, almost the only Indian books on the subject popularly known in the West are such sophisticated and degenerate works as the *Kama Sutra* (a new English edition recently sold five thousand copies in forty-eight hours). It was to combat pernicious assumptions and values that the series of articles "The Building of the Home," was written by the late Shri B. P. Wadia — first printed in *The Theosophical Movement* and now in book form. Though written primarily for Theosophists, it has a constructive and vital message that is sorely needed in all countries, both East and West.

Freedom from Hunger Week, sponsored by FAO (the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), was held by fifty-five nations from 17 to 24 March, with the support of various organizations of similar purpose. The response in Britain has apparently been most satisfactory, though it is too early as yet to assess the total aid given.

What has helped the campaign has

been, and is, the presentation of a number of definite aid-projects, as a concrete means of focusing interest and sympathy. To give money for some vague generalized benevolent purpose, does not mean anything, compared with specific help given to a project with which the donor can warmly identify himself or herself — the setting up of farm institutes in Tanganyika or Sarawak; the importation of Sarda sheep into Tripolitania in order to develop milk and cheese production (a scheme helped by the city of Southampton); development of the fishing industry in Malacca (supported by the fishermen of Grimsby, Lincolnshire); irrigation plans for Kenya or the Aden Protectorate, development aid for the poorer areas of Greece, and many others.

Not only do such projects arouse a great concern on the part of the donors, since they all afford the imagination something to work on, but they are all designed to enable the recipients to help themselves to betterment in the future. It is no mere short-term pauperizing charity that is needed. Though the total task is appallingly vast, no one need hold back because so little help seems possible. Nor can the responsibility be handed over, lock, stock, and barrel, to the impersonal care of government departments. The value of giving lies in the personal touch and interest.

The United Nations Association have produced a covenant scheme for long-term aid. The idea is that each donor delegates a small percentage of his net income after tax, by a seven-year covenant, to one of the overseas projects initiated by the Freedom from Hunger Campaign in conjunction with UN. By this he becomes a SUN (Support for United Nations) Associate, and as the income tax paid by him on the amount can be recovered by the U.N. Association from the Inland Revenue, this adds a not inconsiderable proportion to the original gift.

But it is those, like helpers in Voluntary Service Overseas, and similar bodies, who go out to give personal help, working for and with those to be helped, who perhaps give and gain most. Financial aid is absolutely necessary as a means, but the intangibles of thought and sympathy remain when the money is gone, and truly implement the ideal of the world as one whole.

Local cultural societies in Britain sometimes tend to restrict themselves to familiar fields in their choice of subject. It is interesting, therefore, to find a poetry-reading group in a small place like Boscastle, near Tintagel, Cornwall, embarking on a programme of Eastern poems. Early Chinese poems were followed by a group of Indian lyrics, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. Then a selection from the Persian medieval mystics led finally to examples from Iqbal and Tagore. A commentary and some biographical notes were furnished by the organizer, Miss Margaret Curry. The unfamiliarity of theme, and the strongly marked mystical approach, proved perhaps a little daunting to minds brought up in the orthodox Christian tradition. Even if there were disagreement with the ideas, it led to lively questioning, while the poetry itself (especially that of Tagore) was appreciated. Such provocative occasions are often more beneficial in the long run than mere placid and unthinking enjoyment, since they may lead to a breaking of moulds of thought, hitherto accepted without questioning, and may open the way to a wider viewpoint, however strange the latter seems at first sight.